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Abstract 
We study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine the speciﬁcation 
and price of a good. Suppliers can offer and produce the good in either of two 
possible speciﬁcations, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production 
costs are interdependent and unknown at the time of bidding. Each supplier re­
ceives two signals about production cost, one per speciﬁcation. Our model is a 
special case of the interdependent-value settings with multi-dimensional types in 
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) where an efﬁcient and incentive compatible mecha­
nism exists. We characterize equilibrium bidding behavior if the winning supplier is 
selected purely on the basis of price, regardless of the speciﬁcation offered. While 
there is a positive chance of obtaining an inefﬁcient speciﬁcation, this procurement 
mechanism involves lower information rents than efﬁcient mechanisms, suggesting 
that there is a trade-off between minimizing expected expenditure for the good, and 
ensuring that the efﬁcient speciﬁcation is chosen. 
Keywords: Procurement interdependent valuations multi-dimensional informa­· · 
tion efﬁcient mechanisms optimal mechanisms. · · 
JEL classiﬁcation: C72 D44 D82.· · 
1 Introduction 
In the procurement of complex projects (such as construction work, or defence 
equipment) the exact quality or speciﬁcation of the project is rarely fully deter­
mined by the buyer at the outset. Instead, the purpose of the procurement process 
is to determine the project speciﬁcation, along with the price and the identity of 
the supplier. Such procurement processes (known as two-stage “design-bid-build” 
tenders) are commonly used by purchasers of construction work.1 The ﬁrst stage 
tender serves to elicit information about the available or technically feasible design 
speciﬁcations from expert contractors (e.g. architects, engineering consultancies, 
or defence companies). Thereafter, any contractor who has participated in the ﬁrst 
stage has the opportunity to tender the second stage, where the exact speciﬁcation 
and the price of the project will be determined alongside the identity of the sup­
plier.2 
Our focus in this paper is on the second stage of the procurement process. 
In particular, we consider situations where the buyer, following the ﬁrst stage, has 
drawn up a list of available project speciﬁcations that are deemed close substi­
tutes.3 As an example, note that in the procurement of certain types of military 
equipment, the UK Ministry of Defence assesses available equipment speciﬁca­
tions against minimum criteria, considering all that meet or exceed these criteria as 
“operationally equivalent”.4 While the buyer and the contractors are aware of the 
available project speciﬁcations prior to the second stage tender, there typically re­
main considerable cost uncertainties surrounding each of the design speciﬁcations 
in which contractors can deliver the project.5 Contractors participating in the sec­
ond stage tender therefore have to carefully account for the cost uncertainties when 
1See “Procurement” factsheet published by “Constructing Excellence” available at 
www.constructingexcellence.co.uk 
2Similar multi-stage procedures are used in the procurement of an innovation, as studied by Che 
and Gale (2003), and Scho¨ttner (2008). 
3We thereby abstract from the question whether participants in the ﬁrst stage tender have an 
incentive to withhold or bias their information about feasible project speciﬁcations in order to in­
ﬂuence the list of those that are considered substitutes by the buyer. The literature comprises some 
contributions where sellers choose strategically the information they provide to buyers, albeit in set­
tings different from ours: Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) consider optimal revelation of relevant 
product information by a seller to bidders in a standard one-shot auction, while Ivanov (2011) does 
so in an oligopolistic market setting with competing sellers and a single buyer. 
4See “Cost Effectiveness in UK Defence Procurement: The CO­
EIA” available from NATO Research & Technology Organisation at 
http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFulltext/AGARD/CP/AGARD-CP-602///18CHAP15.pdf 
5E.g. contractor cost uncertainties arise if the project is a custom-designed piece of military 
equipment, along with full contractor support and maintenance throughout the service life of the 
equipment. Similar cost uncertainties also arise in “TotalCare” contracts between UK power systems 
preparing bids and committing to a design speciﬁcation. Equally, a well-designed 
second-stage tender must take into account how participating ﬁrms deal with the 
cost uncertainties in terms of the design speciﬁcation and the price that they choose 
to offer. 
In this paper, we investigate how the buyer, who cares about the price and 
the design speciﬁcation of the project, should structure the second stage procure­
ment process when participating ﬁrms are subject to cost uncertainty at the time 
of tender. We model cost uncertainties by studying a common value environment 
where ﬁrms have only partial information about the cost of providing each of the 
available design speciﬁcations. While the ex post cost of producing a given speciﬁ­
cation are assumed to be identical across ﬁrms, they are unknown to the ﬁrms at the 
time of tender. The assumption of common values can be viewed as capturing sup­
plier uncertainty about buyer characteristics, which affect the cost of customizing 
each design speciﬁcation to the buyer’s particular requirements.6 
Our common value information structure represents a departure from what 
has been assumed in the procurement literature to date (Laffont and Tirole, 1987, 
Che, 1993, Branco, 1997, Asker and Cantillon 2008, 2010, and Rezende, 2009). 
There, the focus is on “private value” environments where ﬁrms have heterogeneous 
cost structures, but do not face uncertainty about their own cost of providing each 
of the available design speciﬁcations. While it is likely that ﬁrms in real-world 
procurement situations face cost uncertainties as well as being heterogeneous in 
their cost structure, we abstract here from the latter issue in order to concentrate on 
the question to which extent a “good” procurement procedure is able to select the 
“right” (or efﬁcient) product speciﬁcation. 
We pursue this question in a stylized environment with two possible prod­
uct speciﬁcations where each participating ﬁrm has multi-dimensional private in­
formation.7 This information consists of a pair of cost-signals, one for each project 
speciﬁcation. In line with our focus on the second stage of a two-stage tender, we 
assume here that the two speciﬁcations of the project generate the same beneﬁt to 
the buyer. Therefore, the question of which speciﬁcation is efﬁcient reduces to the 
question of which speciﬁcation has the lower ex post production cost. We ask if it 
is advisable for the buyer to insist on an efﬁcient speciﬁcation choice if he wants 
company Rolls-Royce and commercial airlines for the provision of, and lifetime maintenance for, 
aircraft engines. 
6The assumption that the cost of the suppliers depend on the buyer’s characteristics are also made 
in Lauermann and Wolinsky (2009), albeit in a different setting. 
7It is important to emphasize that with multi-dimensional private information, efﬁcient mech­
anisms can be implemented only in private value environments, or in very special interdependent 
value environments (see Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000, and Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001). The com­
mon value model we study here falls into the latter category. 
to minimize his expenditure for the project. In other words, is the efﬁcient speciﬁ­
cation also the cheapest from the buyer’s point of view? Or should the buyer focus 
solely on price and disregard differences in speciﬁcation? In order to address these 
questions, we start our investigation into procurement mechanisms with a study 
of a speciﬁc benchmark procedure. Under this procedure, each participating ﬁrm 
submits a two-dimensional bid that consists of a speciﬁcation and a price for the 
project. The two-dimensional bids are then evaluated according to the net beneﬁt 
that they generate for the buyer, and the winning bid is the one with the highest net 
beneﬁt. As both speciﬁcations generate the same (gross) beneﬁt, the prices alone 
determine the identity of the supplier and the chosen design speciﬁcation. We refer 
to this procurement procedure as minimum price mechanism (henceforth MPM). 
The main applied contribution of this paper is the equilibrium analysis of 
the MPM. An interesting result that emerges from this analysis is that the MPM 
- a very natural procurement procedure given that the available speciﬁcations are 
substitutes - will not always result in the efﬁcient speciﬁcation choice (i.e. the 
speciﬁcation whose ex post production cost are lowest).8 However, a rationale for 
using the MPM despite its inefﬁciency emerges when one compares the expected 
expenditure for the project under the MPM to a procurement procedure that guar­
antees delivery of the efﬁcient speciﬁcation. In this efﬁcient procedure, all ﬁrms 
participating in the tender receive lump-sum payments in exchange for their ex­
pert information about the cost of the alternative speciﬁcations. By selecting at 
random a supplier of the efﬁcient speciﬁcation, this procedure aligns the ﬁrms’ in­
centives with that of the buyer (because misrepresentation of a ﬁrm’s information 
does not pay, as it may result in the ﬁrm being chosen to supply the more costly 
speciﬁcation). The MPM delivers lower expected expenditure for the project than 
this efﬁcient procedure in many settings. This suggests there is a trade-off between 
efﬁciency and expenditure-minimization. In order to explore this trade-off more 
formally, we subsequently adopt a mechanism design approach. One key insight 
that emerges is that, in symmetric settings, the MPM displays a feature that all 
expenditure-minimizing procurement processes necessarily share. The other key 
insight is that an optimal procurement process will not be efﬁcient. It is interest­
ing to note that this inefﬁciency property of expenditure-minimizing mechanisms 
arises in the absence of any a priori bias that the buyer may have in favor of a par­
ticular supplier (as in Rezende, 2009), and in the absence of any “price ceilings” 
that the buyer may wish to impose. This contrasts with optimal procurement pro­
8In this respect, we come to a similar conclusion as Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003). They study 
procurement auctions involving unit-price contracts (albeit in a private value setting with one-
dimensional private information). They ﬁnd that such auctions perform better in terms of ex ante 
expenditure than an auction which guarantees ex post efﬁcient outcomes (even if a characterization 
of the optimal auction in their setting remains elusive). 
cedures for a fully speciﬁed project when participating ﬁrms have one-dimensional 
private information (e.g. Myerson, 1981, or Che, 1993). There, in the absence of 
a “price ceiling”, the contract is always allocated to the most efﬁcient ﬁrm. The 
tension between efﬁciency and expenditure-minimization in our model arises from 
the multi-dimensional nature of the ﬁrms’ information, and the added scope for ma­
nipulation that this offers: As the buyer will purchase just one unit of the good, and 
in only one speciﬁcation, ﬁrms can boost the chances of being selected to supply 
their chosen speciﬁcation by strategically misrepresenting their information about 
the other speciﬁcation. In order to deter such behavior, it is important that any ﬁrm 
be selected only to supply the speciﬁcation associated with its minimum signal. But 
by making a commitment to use only information about ﬁrms’ minimum signals, 
the buyer foregoes the opportunity of securing an efﬁcient speciﬁcation. 
The main technical contribution of this paper is to suggest a way for dealing 
with the considerable technical difﬁculties that are inherent in any study of opti­
mal mechanisms in settings with multi-dimensional private information. With the 
exception of the single-agent monopoly screening models studied by Armstrong 
(1996) and Rochet and Chone´ (1998), there are, to date, no general characteriza­
tions of optimal mechanisms for such settings - be that with private or with interde­
pendent values.9 However, there exist in the literature characterizations of incentive 
compatible mechanisms for environments with multi-dimensional signals, extend­
ing the well-known “payoff equivalence” result for settings with single-dimensional 
private information due to Myerson (1981) (see, e.g., Jehiel et al., 1999, Krishna and 
Perry, 2000, Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001, and Krishna and Maenner, 2001). In our 
setting, these payoff equivalence results establish a formal connection between the 
allocation rule by which a speciﬁcation and a supplier are chosen, and the payments 
received by the ﬁrms participating in the mechanism. In particular, a ﬁrm’s interim 
expected payment must be a path-independent path integral of a vector-valued func­
tion. This function, which is the interim expectation of the allocation rule, contains, 
for each speciﬁcation, the probability that a given ﬁrm is chosen as supplier of that 
speciﬁcation. Path-independence means that each ﬁrm’s interim expected payment 
in an incentive compatible mechanism is the same regardless of the path of integra­
tion that has been chosen to compute the interim payment. In other words, the value 
of a ﬁrm’s expected payment for a given signal-vector must be unaffected by the 
chosen path of integration. It is this incentive compatibility condition that distin­
guishes settings with multi-dimensional signals from those with one-dimensional 
9Exceptions are Asker and Cantillon (2010) and Armstrong and Rochet (1999), who circum­
vent the technical difﬁculties by modeling the components of agents’ multi-dimensional signals as 
discrete random variables, rather than continuous random variables as is typically the case in the 
literature. 
signals. The requirement of path-independence as a condition for incentive com­
patibility is awkward to handle as a constraint in any characterization of optimal 
mechanisms. The main technical innovation of this paper is our approach for tak­
ing into account the path-independence requirement. To the best of our knowledge, 
this approach is novel in the mechanism design literature. It allows us to derive 
an expression for the ex ante expected payments received by ﬁrms participating 
in an incentive compatible mechanism. The great advantage of this expression is 
that it can be readily contrasted with the expected payments in a benchmark com­
mon value procurement model with a single product speciﬁcation (where suppliers’ 
private information is one-dimensional), thereby shedding light on the sources of 
ﬁrms’ information rents. 
Related Literature. Our model contributes to the literature on procurement when 
price and quality matter (Laffont and Tirole, 1987, Che, 1993, Branco, 1997, and 
Asker and Cantillon, 2008, 2010). In this literature, the “design speciﬁcations” 
are different quality levels, measured by a continuous variable. All papers apart 
from Asker and Cantillon (2008, 2010) study models in which ﬁrms have one-
dimensional private information about their cost of providing the various quality-
levels. Asker and Cantillon (2010) consider a private value model in which ﬁrms 
have two-dimensional private information about their ﬁxed cost, as well as their 
marginal cost of producing different quality-levels. In order to overcome the tech­
nical difﬁculties associated with the characterization of optimal procurement mech­
anisms, they assume that the components of ﬁrms’ private information (ﬁxed and 
marginal cost) are discrete random variables, each with two possible realizations. 
This simpliﬁcation allows them to fully characterize the optimal procurement mech­
anism for their setting. The optimal mechanism is not efﬁcient, even in the absence 
of a reserve price (unlike the optimal procurement mechanism characterized by 
Laffont and Tirole, 1987 for the case of one-dimensional signals). This tension be­
tween ex post efﬁciency and ex ante expenditure minimization is a feature shared 
with our model. 
This paper also makes a contribution to the literature on mechanism design 
for settings where agents have multi-dimensional private information (see Dasgupta 
and Maskin, 2000, Krishna and Perry, 2000, and Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001). 
Within this literature, the main focus to date has been on the existence and charac­
teristics of efﬁcient mechanisms. For the case of private multi-dimensional values, 
Krishna and Perry (2000) show that within the class of efﬁcient mechanisms, gener­
alized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are optimal (in the sense of maximizing 
revenue), even if Bayes Nash implementation (rather than dominant strategy imple­
mentation) is used. We make a contribution to this literature by showing a way in 
which the path-independence property of incentive compatible mechanisms can be 
explicitly taken into account in the optimization problem that forms the basis for 
the characterization of optimal mechanisms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the 
basics of our model. Section 3 describes the MPM and provides a characteriza­
tion of ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies. In Section 4 we introduce direct revelation 
mechanism, as well as the notation and concepts required for our mechanism de­
sign analysis of procurement procedures. Section 5 contains our main characteriza­
tion results regarding the ex ante expenditure of incentive compatible procurement 
mechanisms, as well as the derivation of necessary conditions that any expenditure-
minimizing mechanism must display. In Section 6 we build on these results to argue 
that expenditure-minimizing mechanisms will not be efﬁcient. Section 7 concludes, 
and the Appendix in Section 8 contains all proofs. 
2 Model 
2.1 Model basics 
Setting. A buyer wishes to purchase a single unit of an indivisible good that can 
be produced in two different design speciﬁcations. Let K ≡ {A,B} denote the set 
of available design speciﬁcations. We assume that the buyer considers the two 
speciﬁcations perfect substitutes, and derives the same beneﬁt b > 0 from each of 
them. The buyer’s von Neumann Morgenstern utility is b − p if he pays a price of 
p for the good, regardless of its speciﬁcation. There are n ﬁrms from whom this 
good can be sourced. Let I ≡ {1, . . . ,n} be the set of ﬁrms. The production cost 
Ck of each speciﬁcation k ∈ K are common to the suppliers. Firm i’s von Neumann 
Morgenstern utility is p −Ck if the good is purchased from ﬁrm i in speciﬁcation 
k at price p. If the good is not sourced from ﬁrm i, then ﬁrm i incurs no cost. 
The production cost Ck of each speciﬁcation k ∈ K are unknown to the buyer and 
to the ﬁrms at the time of competing for the buyer’s custom. However, the ﬁrms 
have an informational advantage over the buyer, in that each ﬁrm has some private 
information about the cost Ck of each speciﬁcation. 
Information Structure. We assume that ﬁrm i’s private information consists of 
two cost-signals: sA
i and sB
i . Signal sk
i is ﬁrm i’s private information about the pro­
duction cost of speciﬁcation k. We refer to the signal-vector si ≡ (sAi ,sBi ) as ﬁrm 
i’s type, and denote by S ≡ [0,1]2 the set of possible types. We assume that si is 
a random variable which is only observed by ﬁrm i. The ﬁrms’ types are stochas­
tically independent, and they are identically distributed according to a continuous 
joint density f such that (s.t.) f (sA,sB) > 0 for all (sA,sB) in the interior of S. Re­
garding the connection between the ﬁrms’ types and the production cost of each 
speciﬁcation, we assume that the cost of speciﬁcation k is given by the average of 
the ﬁrms’ signals about speciﬁcation k: 
1
Ck ≡ n ∑sk
i ∀k ∈ K (1) 
i∈I 
Notation. We denote by s ≡ (s1 , . . . ,sn) the vector of all ﬁrms’ types, with s ∈
S × . . . × S ≡ Sn. Let s−i ≡ (s1 , . . . ,si−1 ,si+1 , . . . ,sn) ∈ Sn−1 be the vector of all but 
ﬁrm i’s types. Likewise, let sk ≡ (sk 1 , . . . ,snk) be the vector of all ﬁrms’ k-signals, 
and let sk
−i ≡ (s1 k , . . . ,ski−1 ,ski+1 , . . . ,snk ) be the vector of all but ﬁrm i’s k-signals. 
We write g(s) ≡ ∏i∈I f (si) and g(s−i) ≡ ∏ j=� i f (s j). For ease of notation, let mi ≡
argmink∈K sk
i be the speciﬁcation associated with ﬁrm i’s minimum signal, and Mi ≡ 
argmaxk∈K sk
i the speciﬁcation associated with ﬁrm i’s maximum signal. 
2.2 Symmetry 
Given the independent nature of the ﬁrms’ information, and the symmetry of the 
cost functions Ck, we say that our setting is symmetric with respect to (w.r.t.) ﬁrms.10 
In addition to this form of symmetry, our model admits a second form of symmetry: 
Deﬁnition 1. We say the setting is symmetric w.r.t. speciﬁcations if the joint density 
f is symmetric around the 45◦-line: f (sB,sA) = f (sA,sB) for all (sA,sB) ∈ S.11 
In what follows, we shall focus on two types of settings, depending on 
whether the model displays symmetry w.r.t. speciﬁcations, or not: 
Symmetric correlated settings. The setting displays symmetry w.r.t. ﬁrms and 
w.r.t. speciﬁcations. 
Independent asymmetric settings. In such settings, the cost signals sk are inde­
pendently but non-identically distributed, with cumulative distribution function Hk 
on [0,1] for all k ∈ K. We write Hk f.o.s.d. Hl (l ∈ K, l =� k) if Hk ﬁrst-order stochas­
tically dominates Hl . Each Hk has a continuous derivative hk, with hk(sk) > 0 for 
10For each speciﬁcation k, the cost function Ck(sk) is symmetric in the following sense: Ck(sk) = 
(1/n)(sik + s
−
k
i) ∀i ∈ I. 
11If f is symmetric around the 45◦-line then Pr{sA < sB} = 1/2. 
all sk ∈ (0,1), so that f (sA,sB) = hA(sA)hB(sB) > 0 for all (sA,sB) in the interior of 
S.12 
2.3 Efﬁciency 
Given our assumption that the buyer derives the same beneﬁt from each design 
speciﬁcation, it follows that for all type-vectors s ∈ Sn, the ex post efﬁcient design 
speciﬁcation is determined by the production cost alone: 
Deﬁnition 2. Speciﬁcation A is efﬁcient if CA(sA) < CB(sB) ⇔ ∑i∈I siA < ∑i∈I siB; 
otherwise, speciﬁcation B is efﬁcient. 
Because of the common value nature of the production cost, efﬁciency per­
tains solely to the speciﬁcation of the object, not to the identity of the supplier. We 
adopt the particular common value cost structure in (1) so as to address the question 
whether an efﬁcient procurement process can ever be expenditure-minimizing. For 
this purpose, we need an environment where efﬁcient and implementable procure­
ment procedures exist. As Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show, efﬁcient procedures 
can be implemented only in special settings, which is why we assume the cost 
structure in (1).13 
3 Minimum price mechanism 
In this section, we start our investigation of procurement procedures available to 
the buyer with a simple and intuitive benchmark mechanism. In this mechanism, 
the buyer selects a supplier on the basis of price alone, disregarding any differences 
in the ﬁrms’ design speciﬁcations. We refer to this procedure as “minimum price 
mechanism” (MPM). 
12If the assumption of independent cost-signals appears restrictive, note that the same qualitative 
results obtain when sA and sB are non-independent random variables with a joint density of the form 
f (sA,sB) = asA +(2 − a)sB, where a ∈ (0,2) and a =� 1. 
13The existence of implementable efﬁcient procedures in our setting follows from Theorem 4.3 
in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). To see that the theorem applies, note that our setting is a special 
case of the environment studied by Jehiel and Moldovanu. Our setting can be thought of as having 
2n different “social alternatives”, with generic social alternative (k, i) ∈ K × I. For every alternative 
(k, i), each ﬁrm j ∈ I has a one-dimensional signal s
(
j
k,i) = sk
j that affects (in different ways) the 
cost functions of the n ﬁrms: in alternative (k, i), the cost function C(
i
k,i)(s(
1 
k,i), . . . ,s
n 
(k,i)) of ﬁrm i 
takes the value Ck(sk) given in (1), and the cost function C(
j
k,i)(s
1 
(k,i), . . . ,s
n 
(k,i)) of any ﬁrm j ( j =� i) 
takes the value zero. It is straightforward to verify that the conditions of Theorem 4.3 in Jehiel and 
Moldovanu (2001) hold in this setting. 
� 
3.1 Mechanism basics 
Rules. The buyer asks each ﬁrm to submit a two-dimensional bid consisting of 
a speciﬁcation and a price. Let ki ∈ K be the speciﬁcation chosen by ﬁrm i, and 
denote by pk
i 
i 
the price that ﬁrm i demands in return for delivery of the good in 
speciﬁcation ki. Under the MPM, the buyer commits to sourcing the good at the 
lowest price, irrespective of the speciﬁcations proposed by the ﬁrms. I.e. given 
prices (p1 , . . . , pn ), the buyer sources the good from ﬁrm j ∈ argmini∈I pi . Firm k1 kn ki 
j is paid an amount equal to its price pk
j 
j 
in return for producing the good in speci­
ﬁcation k j. All ﬁrms other than the chosen supplier j receive no payment. 
Strategies. In the Bayesian game induced by the MPM, a strategy for any ﬁrm 
i ∈ I consists of three functions: A speciﬁcation choice rule δi : S → K,si �→ δi(si), 
and a pricing function pik : S → R+,si �→ pik(si) for each speciﬁcation k ∈ K. The 
interpretation is as follows: each ﬁrm i commits to producing the good in speciﬁca­
tion δi(si) = ki in return for a payment of piki (s
i). To facilitate the characterization 
of equilibrium strategies (δi, pA
i , pB
i ), we restrict attention those that satisfy the fol­
lowing properties P1-P3: 
P1 The speciﬁcation choice δi rule takes the following form: Given an increasing 
and continuous function Xi : R → R, siA �→ Xi(sAi ), with inverse Xi−1 s.t. either 
X−1(0) ≥ 0, or X−1(1) ≤ 1, or neither: i i 
A if sB
i > Xi(sA
i )δi(si) = B if siB < Xi(s
i
A) 
P2 The price of any speciﬁcation depends only on the signal pertaining to that 
speciﬁcation. I.e. for all i ∈ I, all si ∈ S, and all k ∈ K: pik(si) = pik(sik). 
P3 If a ﬁrm is indifferent between speciﬁcation A and speciﬁcation B, it quotes the 
same price regardless of the speciﬁcation it chooses. I.e. for all i ∈ I, and all si ∈ S 
s.t. sB
i = Xi(sA
i ): pA
i (sA
i ) = pB
i (Xi(sA
i )). 
Fig. 1 illustrates two speciﬁcation choice rules of the form in P1. While 
there are four types of functions Xi that are compatible with P1, the two types shown 
in Fig. 1 are representative. This is because the remaining two types of Xi can be 
generated from those in Fig.1 by interchanging the speciﬁcation labels A and B, and 
then deﬁning a new function Xˆi s.t. Xˆi(sA
i ) ≡ X−1(sAi ) for all sAi ∈ [0,min{1,Xi(1)}].i 
For a speciﬁcation choice rule δi with X−1(0) ≥ 0 (as illustrated in both panels i 
of Fig. 1), properties P2 and P3 together imply that a single pricing function pA
i 
sufﬁces to generate the prices of both speciﬁcations A and B: 
∆iHsA
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Figure 1: Two speciﬁcation choice rules δi that satisfy property P1 
Lemma 1. If a strategy (δi, piA, pB
i ) in the MPM satisﬁes properties P1-P3, then the 
pricing function piB for speciﬁcation B is the composition of p
i
A : [0,min{X−1(1),1}] 
iR+ and Xi. I.e. piB(x) = pA(X
−1(x)) for all x ∈ [0,min{1,Xi(1)}].
i → 
i 
In the following, we look for symmetric equilibria of the MPM where the 
strategy (δ , pA, pB) used by all ﬁrms satisﬁes properties P1-P3 above.14 Building 
on Lemma 1 we can establish: 
Lemma 2. Any symmetric equilibrium (δ , pA, pB) of the MPM that satisﬁes prop­
erties P1-P3 features a pricing function pA that is increasing and differentiable 
everywhere, with the exception of x = X−1(0). 
3.2 Equilibrium speciﬁcation choice rule 
Properties P1-P3 in Section 3.1 play an important role in the equilibrium charac­
terization. They allow us to pin down, independently of the pricing functions pA 
and pB, the function X that determines the equilibrium speciﬁcation choice rule δ . 
To see this, consider a ﬁrm with type si who is indifferent between offering speci­
ﬁcation A or B: sB
i = X(sA
i ). P3 requires ﬁrm i to quote the same price regardless 
of the speciﬁcation it chooses: pA(sA
i ) = pB(X(sA
i )) ≡ p. For this to be compatible 
14There may of course be other equilibria. 
with equilibrium behavior, the expected production cost (conditional on winning 
the contract with a price of p) must be identical for the two speciﬁcations. This 
observation gives rise to the following characterization of the equilibrium speciﬁ­
cation choice rule: 
Lemma 3. Any symmetric equilibrium (δ , pA, pB) of the MPM that satisﬁes prop­
erties P1-P3 features a speciﬁcation choice rule δ where, for every x ∈ [0,1], the 
function X(x) is deﬁned implicitly by: 
Pr{sA > x,sB > X(x)}n−1 (x − X(x)+(n − 1)E[sA − sB |sA > x,sB > X(x)]) = 0 
The next result shows which form the equilibrium function X takes if the 
model is symmetric w.r.t. ﬁrms and w.r.t. speciﬁcations: 
Lemma 4. In correlated symmetric settings, if the equilibrium strategy (δ , pA, pB) 
satisﬁes properties P1-P3, the unique speciﬁcation choice rule δ is characterized 
by the function X(x) = x for all x ∈ [0,1]. 
I.e. in fully symmetric settings, each ﬁrm chooses the speciﬁcation asso­
ciated with its minimum signal. This is no longer the case in settings that are not 
symmetric w.r.t. speciﬁcations. 
Lemma 5. In independent asymmetric settings where HB f.o.s.d. HA (resp. HA 
f.o.s.d. HB), if the equilibrium strategy (δ , pA, pB) satisﬁes properties P1-P3, the 
unique speciﬁcation choice rule δ is characterized by an increasing and differen­
tiable function X s.t. X(x) ≤ x (resp. X(x) ≥ x) for all x ∈ [0,1), and X(1) = 1. 
The left-hand (resp. right-hand) panel of Fig. 2 illustrates the speciﬁcation 
choice rule δ by depicting the function X that arises if HB f.o.s.d. HA (resp. HA 
f.o.s.d. HB).15 Types si above the solid black curve in both panels of Fig. 2 (which 
represents the graph of X) choose speciﬁcation A, while types si below the solid 
black curve choose speciﬁcation B. 
3.3 Equilibrium pricing functions 
In correlated symmetric settings, where the speciﬁcation choice rule is character­
ized by the function X(x) = x, the pricing functions for the two speciﬁcations are 
15Given a joint density f (sA,sB) = asA +(2−a)sB, a function X of the form in the left-hand panel 
of Fig. 2 arises if a < 1, while a function X of the form in the right-hand panel arises if a > 1. Our 
characterization of the equilibrium pricing functions pA and pB in Section 3.3 therefore also applies 
to this class of non-independent asymmetric settings. 
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Figure 2: Representative equilibrium speciﬁcation choice rules in independent 
asymmetric settings 
identical: pA(x) = pB(x) ≡ p(x) for all x ∈ [0,1]. This means that in a symmetric 
equilibrium (δ , p) each ﬁrm i offers the speciﬁcation associated with its minimum 
signal at the price p(sm
i 
i 
). The following result completes our equilibrium charac­
terization for correlated symmetric settings: 
Proposition 1. In correlated symmetric settings, the unique symmetric equilibrium 
(δ , p) that satisﬁes properties P1-P3 features the following pricing function: 
p(x) = 
nω
n 
(
− 
x)
1 
n−1 
� 
x 
1 
ω(r)n−2 (r + E[sk |sk > r,sl = r ]+ (n − 2)E[sk |sk,sl > r ])dr 
+ 
nω
n 
(
− 
x)
1 
n−1 (n − 1) 
� 
x 
1 
ω(r)n−2 (2r +(n − 2)E[sk |sk,sl > r ])dr (2) 
where ω(x) ≡ Pr{sA,sB > x}. 
Appearances notwithstanding, the pricing function p in Proposition 1 has a 
neat interpretation. To see this, suppose that ﬁrm i’s minimum signal takes the value 
r, and pertains to speciﬁcation k. Suppose also that ﬁrm i is the chosen supplier. In 
the symmetric equilibrium, where all ﬁrms use the same increasing pricing function, 
this implies that ﬁrm i’s minimum signal r is lower than the minimum signals of 
� 
all other ﬁrms. Now consider the second term of (2), where the expression 2r + 
(n − 2)E[sk |sk,sl > r ] captures ﬁrm i’s expected production cost of speciﬁcation k 
if the minimum signal of one other ﬁrm is r and pertains to speciﬁcation k, while 
the minimum signals of the remaining n − 2 ﬁrms are all greater than r. Next, 
consider the ﬁrst term of (2), where the expression r + E[sk |sk > r,sl = r ] + (n −
2)E[sk |sk,sl > r ] captures ﬁrm i’s expected production cost of speciﬁcation k if 
the minimum signal of one other ﬁrm is r and pertains to speciﬁcation l, while the 
minimum signals of the remaining n−2 ﬁrms are all greater than r. This reveals that 
the equilibrium price of any ﬁrm i equals the expected production cost of its chosen 
speciﬁcation when its own minimum signal is equal to the lowest minimum signal 
amongst its n − 1 competitors. In computing these expected production cost, ﬁrm 
i must account for the fact that the lowest minimum signal among its competitors 
can pertain either to the same speciﬁcation as its own minimum signal (see second 
term of (2)), or to the other speciﬁcation (see ﬁrst term of (2)). 
We now turn to independent asymmetric settings, in which it is no longer the 
case that a single function p sufﬁces to generate the price for both speciﬁcations.16 
The reason is that in any setting where the speciﬁcation choice rule is as shown in 
the left-hand panel of Fig. 2, the pricing function for speciﬁcation A must be deﬁned 
piecewise: one function p˘ for types si s.t. sA
i < X−1(0), and another function p¯ for 
types si s.t. sA
i ≥ X−1(0). The pricing functions pA and pB are then given as follows: 
p˘(x) if 0 ≤ x < X−1(0) 
pA(x) = p¯(x) if X−1(0) ≤ x ≤ 1 (3) 
and 
pB(x) = p¯(X−1(x)), where X−1(0) < x ≤ 1 (4) 
The next proposition completes the equilibrium characterization for inde­
pendent asymmetric settings by stating the functions p¯ and p˘ if HB f.o.s.d. HA.17 
16Recall that “asymmetry” here refers to the shape of the joint density f from which each ﬁrm’s 
type is drawn, rather than different type-distributions across the n ﬁrms. We therefore do not en­
counter here the challenges associated with the analytical characterization of equilibrium strategies 
in the ﬁrst-price auction when bidders’ types are drawn from different distributions, as e.g. studied 
by Kaplan and Zamir (2010) for private-value settings, or Cheng and Tan (2010) for common-value 
settings. 
17Observe that once we know the equilibrium pricing functions for this case, we automatically 
know the pricing functions for settings where HA f.o.s.d. HB. The reason is that for any joint 
density f (sA,sB) s.t. X is as shown in the right-hand panel of Fig. 2, we can deﬁne a new density 
fˆ (sA,sB) = f (sB,sA), for which the associated function Xˆ is as shown in the left-hand panel of Fig. 
2, with X(sA) = Xˆ−1(sA) for all sA ∈ [0,1]. 
Proposition 2. In independent asymmetric settings where HB f.o.s.d. HA, the unique 
symmetric equilibrium (δ , pA, pB) that satisﬁes properties P1-P3 features the fol­
lowing pricing functions: for all x ∈ [X−1(0),1], 
p¯(x) = 
nω
n 
(
− 
x)
1 
n−1 
� 
x 
1 
ω(r)n−2 (r +(n − 1)EA[sA |sA > r ])X �(r)(1 − HA(r))hB(X(r))dr 
+ 
nω
n 
(
− 
x)
1 
n−1 
� 
x 
1 
ω(r)n−2 (2r +(n − 2)EA[sA |sA > r ]) (1 − HB(X(r)))hA(r)dr 
(5) 
where ω(x) ≡ Pr{sA > x,sB > X(x)}; and for all x ∈ [0,X−1(0)], 
p˘(x) = 
n(1 − 
n
H
− 
A(
1 
x))n−1 
� 
x
X−1(0)
(1 − HA(r))n−2 (2r +(n − 2)EA[sA |sA > r ])hA(r)dr 
� 
1 − HA(X−1(0)) 
�n−1 p¯(X−1(0)) 
+
(1 − HA(x))n−1 
(6) 
In the Appendix we provide a uniﬁed proof of Propositions 1 and 2 by as­
suming that X is an increasing and differentiable function with X−1(0) ≥ 0 and 
X(1) = 1. This assumption covers speciﬁcation choice rules of the form in the 
left-hand panel of Fig. 2, as well as the speciﬁcation choice rule for correlated sym­
metric settings in Lemma 3. Given the functions p˘ and p¯, the pricing function p for 
correlated symmetric settings (where X−1(0) = 0) is given by p(x) = p¯(x) for all 
x ∈ [0,1].18 
4 Direct revelation mechanisms 
In this section, we adopt a mechanism design approach to the study of procurement 
procedures at the buyer’s disposal. By the revelation principle, we can restrict our 
study of procurement procedures to the class of direct revelation mechanisms. 
Deﬁnition 3. A social choice rule (SCR) is a function Q : Sn Δ(K × I), assigning 
to each s ∈ Sn probabilities {Qik(s)}(k,i)∈K×I , where ∀s ∈ Sn: 0
→
≤ Qik(s) ≤ 1 ∀(k, i) ∈
K × I and ∑(k,i)∈K×I Qik(s) = 1. 
18To account for the fact that the fully symmetric version of our model allows for correlated cost-
signals, while the asymmetric case assumes signal independence, the proof derives the functions p¯
and p˘ in terms of general conditional distributions Fk and marginal densities fk (where k, l ∈ K, 
l =� k). 
|l 
� � � � 
Deﬁnition 4. A direct revelation mechanism (DRM) is a pair (Q,T ), where T : 
Sn → R|I| is a payment scheme, with s �→ T (s) = (T1(s), . . . ,Tn(s)). 
For a given DRM (Q,T ), deﬁne for every i ∈ I and every report ri � � ∈ S 
a conditional expected payment function ti(ri) ≡ E Ti(ri ,s−i) and a conditional 
expected probability assignment function qi(ri) ≡ (qi i),qi i)), with qi � � A(r B(r k(ri) ≡
E Qik(r
i ,s−i) for all k ∈ K. If all other ﬁrms report truthfully their types s−i and 
ﬁrm i reports a type ri instead of its true type si, we write i’s expected proﬁt as 
ui(ri ,si) ≡ ti(ri) − E ∑k∈K Qki (ri ,s−i)Ck(sk) . Denote by µi(si) ≡ ui(si ,si) ﬁrm i’s 
expected proﬁt from truthful revelation of its type, and let ci(si) ≡ E ∑k∈K Qki (s)Ck(sk) 
be ﬁrm i’s expected production cost when it reports truthfully its type. We can then 
express i’s expected payment in a DRM as ti(si) = µi(si) + ci(si). As the ﬁrms’ 
types are privately observed, in practice we can only implement incentive compati­
ble DRMs. 
Deﬁnition 5. (Q,T ) is incentive compatible if ∀i ∈ I, ∀si ,ri ∈ S: µi(si) ≥ ui(ri ,si). 
We assume that participation in any DRM is voluntary for the ﬁrms, and 
that each ﬁrm can guarantee itself a proﬁt of zero by opting out of any proposed 
DRM. 
Deﬁnition 6. (Q,T ) is individually rational if ∀i ∈ I, ∀si ∈ S: µi(si) = ui(si ,si) ≥ 0. 
We evaluate DRMs according to the level of expenditure that the buyer ex­
pects to commit ex ante to the purchase of the good. 
Deﬁnition 7. Ex ante expenditure associated with (Q,T ) is E [∑i∈I Ti(s)]. 
Deﬁnition 8. (Q,T ) is optimal if it minimizes ex ante expenditure among all incen­
tive compatible and individually rational DRMs.19 
5 Expenditure minimization 
Implementable DRMs. We now translate into our setting the standard character­
ization of incentive compatible DRMs when agents have multidimensional types. 
Because the proof of this result is familiar from the literature, we omit it.20 
19We have in mind a setting in which the buyer must purchase the good, and therefore does not 
have the option of setting a price-ceiling for the good. 
20For a proof see, e.g., Theorem 3.1 in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). Alternative sources include 
Jehiel et al. (1999), Krishna and Perry (2000) and Rochet (1987). 
� 
Proposition 3. For given SCR Q and interim expected payments τi ∈ R to the 
boundary types si = (1,1) ≡ 1, there exist payments Ti for all i ∈ I s.t. (Q,T ) is 
incentive compatible, individually rational, and ti(1) = τi, if and only if: 
(i) qi is monotone and conservative for all i ∈ I, 
(ii) τi ≥ ci(1) for all i ∈ I. 
Moreover, ﬁrm i’s interim expected payment ti associated with Ti is given by: 
ti(si) = ti(1) − ci(1)+ ci(si)+ 
Γ(si ,1) 
qi · dα (7) 
for all i ∈ I and all si ∈ S, and for any continuous, piecewise smooth path Γ in S 
joining si and the boundary type 1. 
Ex ante expenditure. In the spirit of Myerson (1981)’s approach to optimal auc­
tion design, we now derive a manageable expression for ex ante expenditure by 
incorporating binding feasibility constraints into the buyer’s objective function. In 
classic mechanism design settings with one-dimensional private information, the 
only binding constraint is that interim payments ti be determined by the SCR, up to 
an additive constant. For settings with multi-dimensional private information such 
as ours, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that an additional constraint is bind­
ing, namely that the conditional expected probability assignment functions qi be 
conservative (see item (i) of Proposition 3). In order to mimic Myerson (1981)’s 
approach, we therefore have to ﬁnd a way of explicitly incorporating this awkward 
constraint into the buyer’s objective function. To do this, we exploit an equivalent 
property: The statement that qi is conservative is equivalent to saying that, for any 
type si, the value of the path integral of qi in (7) is the same for any continuous, 
piecewise smooth path joining types si and 1. This property is called path indepen­
dence. It implies, in particular, that we obtain the same value for ﬁrm i’s interim 
expected payment ti(si) regardless of whether we calculate the path integral in (7) 
along path Γ1 or along path Γ2, both shown in Fig. 3. Using this implication of path 
independence, we obtain as a corollary to Proposition 3 the following result: 
Corollary 1. For every si ∈ S the interim expected payment ti associated with an 
incentive compatible DRM (Q,T ) can be expressed equivalently by evaluating the 
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Figure 3: Two paths of integration 
path integral of qi between si and 1 along path Γ1 (cf. (8)) or along path Γ2 (cf. 
(9)): � 1 � 1 
ti(si) = ti(1) − ci(1)+ ci(si)+ qAi (x,sBi )dx + qBi (1,x)dx (8)i isA sB � 1 � 1 
= ti(1) − ci(1)+ ci(si)+ 
sB
i 
qB
i (sA
i ,x)dx + 
sA
i 
qA
i (x,1)dx. (9) 
We can now state a manageable expression for ex ante expenditure when 
the buyer uses a DRM that generates interim payments ti that satisfy the equality in 
Corollary 1. To obtain this expression, we have computed the ex ante expected 
payment E[ti(si)] to any ﬁrm i by making use of both equations (8) and (9) in 
Corollary 1.21 In particular, for types si s.t. siB < sA
i , we have used the expression 
for ti(si) in (8), and for types si s.t. sA
i < sB
i , we have used the expression for ti(si) 
in (9). By adding up the individual ﬁrms’ ex ante payments, we can then write ex 
ante expenditure solely in terms of the probabilities Qik that constitute the SCR Q. 
21Note that our approach here differs form the one taken by Armstrong (1996) in a monopoly 
screening setting. When translated to our setting, his approach means computing ex ante expenditure 
under an incentive compatible DRM along a single path (the straight line from type si to the boundary 
type 1). However, in our setting it is not clear how to then derive conditions on the signal-density 
f s.t. a DRM which minimizes pointwise ex ante expenditure satisﬁes the binding requirement that 
the conditional expected probability assignment functions qi are conservative. 
�

�
� � ��
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Proposition 4. For any incentive compatible DRM (Q,T ) the buyer’s ex ante ex­
penditure ∑i∈I E[ti(si)] is:22 
i s
i l )
i i 
l ) � F(s
F(s
 s
kQik(s) Ck(sk)+ Qik((sik,1),s−i) − Qik(s)∑ ∑
 mi i g(s)ds
+
i i 
l ) s

i 
l )f (s
 f (s
s
i∈I k,l∈K 
l=k 
k kSn 
+ ∑(ti(1) − ci(1))

i∈I

With exception of the constants ti(1) − ci(1), all terms in the expression for 
ex ante expenditure in Proposition 4 are fully determined by the SCR Q. The key 
advantage of expressing ex ante expenditure in this way is that we can gain a bet­
ter understanding for the sources of ﬁrms’ information rents in our setting. For 
this purpose, it is instructive to compare ex ante expenditure in Proposition 4 with 
ex ante expenditure in a benchmark model with one-dimensional private informa­
tion: Consider a procurement setting with n ﬁrms and a single product speciﬁcation. 
The ﬁrms’ production cost are common and given by C(σ1, . . . ,σn) ≡ (1/n)∑i∈I σi, 
where the cost-signals σi ∈ [0,1] are i.i.d. random variables with distribution H, ob­
served privately by each ﬁrm i (i ∈ I). In this setting, a SCR assigns to each signal-
vector σ ≡ (σ1, . . . ,σn) probabilities Qi(σ) (one for each ﬁrm i), where Qi(σ) is 
the probability that the good is purchased from ﬁrm i when the ﬁrms’ signals are σ . 
Using standard steps from the mechanism design literature with one-dimensional 
private information, we obtain the following expression for the buyer’s ex ante ex­
penditure in this benchmark setting: 
H(σi) 
h(σi) 
h(σ1) · . . .
·
h(σn)dσ + ∑ 
i∈I 
(ti(1) − ci(1)) (10)∑
 Qi(σ) C(σ)+ 
i∈I 
[0,1]n 
Now compare this benchmark expression for ex ante expenditure with the 
one in Proposition 4 (with i.i.d. cost signals sk
i for comparability). There, if a ﬁrm 
is chosen to produce speciﬁcation k, it receives information rents of H(sk
i )/h(sk
i ) 
which are needed to ensure truthful revelation of the signal pertaining to speciﬁca­
tion k. This source of information rents is present also in the benchmark setting (see 
22We write Qik((sk
i ,1),s−i) for the probability that supplier i is chosen to supply speciﬁcation k 
when his k-signal is sk
i , and the cost-signal for the other speciﬁcation is 1. I.e. for k = A we have 
A,1),s
−i) and for k = B we have Qi B
i ),s−i). Also, when there is no risk of confusion, 
we ease notation by writing F(s
QiA((s
i 
B((1,s
i i i 
l ) for the conditional distribution Fk
i i 
l ), 
i 
l ) for the f (sl (ss s sk k k|
i i i i 
l ), and f (sk) for the marginal density fk(sk).conditional density fk l (s sk|
�
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�

�
��
��
�
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equation (10)). However, ex ante expenditure in Proposition 4 features an additional 
term that inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s level of information rents: 
Qik((s
i
k,1),s
−i) − Qik(s) H(smi i )/h(ski ) 
This term awards additional rents to ﬁrm i if the probability of being chosen to pro­
duce speciﬁcation k increases in ﬁrm i’s l-signal. Intuitively, this term recognizes 
that any ﬁrm can always make any one of its two signals look relatively more at­
tractive by exaggerating the realization of the other signal. Thereby, the ﬁrm can 
reveal truthfully one of its signals, while manipulating the relative cost of the two 
speciﬁcations. In order to deter manipulations of this kind, extra information rents 
may be necessary. 
Properties of optimal DRMs. We now investigate properties of optimal DRMs 
in our setting by looking for SCRs that minimize ex ante expenditure in Proposition 
4. For this purpose, we propose the following optimization problem of the buyer: 
Choose a SCR Q and interim payments ti(1) to the boundary type 1 of each ﬁrm 
i so as to minimize ex ante expenditure: 
i s
i l )F(s
∑ ∑ Qki ((ski ,1),s−i) mi i g(s)ds
s
i l )f (s
i∈I k,l∈K 
l=k 
kSn 
i i i) − F(s iF(s
 )
s
 s
MiQi Mi 
mi mi mi 
Sn � 
+ ∑ 
+	 ∑Qimi (s)Cmi (smi )g(s)ds + ∑(ti(1) − ci(1)) (11) 
Sn i∈I i∈I 
subject to the constraints that for every ﬁrm i ∈ I: 
(i) the function qi be monotone, 
(ii) ti(1) ≥ ci(1). 
In this optimization problem, the objective function is given by ex ante ex­
penditure in Proposition 4, however expressed equivalently in terms of the ﬁrms’ 
minimum and maximum signals sm
i 
i 
and si , resp. Recall that this objective func-Mi 
tion explicitly incorporates the constraint that for every ﬁrm i, the expressions for 
interim payments ti in equations (8) and (9) must be equal for all si ∈ S. While 
this is only one manifestation of the path independence requirement of incentive 
CMi (sMi )+ g(s)ds
(s)
 i si mif (s
 )
i∈I Mi 
�
 �

�� �� ��
compatible DRMs, we show below that it is sufﬁcient to ensure that the functions 
qi are conservative, as required by item (i) of Proposition 3. To see this, note ﬁrst 
that any DRM that solves the buyer’s optimization problem above must involve 
ti(1) = ci(1). This implies that the individual rationality constraint is binding only 
for the boundary type 1. We can therefore characterize optimal DRMs solely in 
terms of the SCR Q. While we are unable to fully characterize SCRs that minimize 
the objective function above, we can derive the following necessary feature that any 
solution to the above optimization problem must display: A ﬁrm is only ever se­
lected to produce the speciﬁcation associated with its minimum signal. This result 
is established by looking for SCRs that contribute to pointwise minimization of the 
components of ex ante expenditure in lines two and three of (11) when the mono­
tonicity constraints are disregarded. Note that pointwise minimization of the full 
objective function in (11) appears intractable because, in addition to determining 
probabilities Qik at any given type-vector s in the interior of S
n, one has to simul­
taneously determine the probabilities Qik for types ((sk
i ,1),s−i) on the boundary of 
Sn . 
Proposition 5. If Q minimizes ex ante expenditure, then Qi (s) = 0 for all s in the Mi 
interior of Sn and all i ∈ I. 
It is important to note that monotonicity of the functions qi (as required by 
item (i) of Proposition 3) is not compromised by the use of SCRs that satisfy the 
property in Proposition 5. In other words, any SCR that solves the buyer’s opti­
mization problem inclusive of monotonicity constraint (i) must have the property in 
Proposition 5.23 We can show furthermore: 
Proposition 6. If a SCR Q satisﬁes the necessary condition for optimality in Propo­
sition 5 and features conditional expected probability assignment functions qi s.t. 
(8) and (9) in Corollary 1 are equal, there exists ρi : [0,1] → [0,1] s.t. ∀i ∈ I, ∀si ∈ S: 
i i 
A) if sA
i < s if siA < s
iρi(s 0
q
i A(s
i) = B and qiB(s
i) = i 
B (12)

if siA > s ρi(sB
i ) if sA
i > si0
 B.B 
Recall from item (i) of Proposition 3 that incentive compatible DRMs fea­
ture monotone conditional expected probability assignment functions. By Propo­
sition 6, any optimal incentive compatible DRM therefore features monotonically 
23Intuitively, monotonicity does not conﬂict with the property in Proposition 5, because for any 
type-vector s ∈ Sn s.t. speciﬁcation k ∈ K is chosen, there is at least one ﬁrm s.t. mi = k. I.e. 
when minimizing information rents required for the purchase of speciﬁcation k, there exists always 
a ﬁrm i which, if chosen as supplier of speciﬁcation k, will not need to be paid the rent component 
i i i i i ) in (11). This component is positive for all si regardless of mi(F(s ) − F(s ))/ f (ss s sMi Mimi mi mi 
the distribution F , and it is therefore immaterial how it behaves as a function of si . 
i 
decreasing functions ρi. I.e. we can restrict our search for expenditure-minimizing 
DRMs to SCRs that display these characteristics: 
Proposition 7. Any SCR Q with conditional expected probability assignment func­
tions qi in Proposition 6 and decreasing functions ρi can be part of an incentive 
compatible DRM. 
Proposition 7 conﬁrms that our approach of taking into account a single im­
plication of the path-independence property of incentive compatible DRMs (in the 
form of Corollary 1) sufﬁciently restricts the class of admissible DRMs so that the 
associated conditional expected probability assignment functions qi are conserva­
tive, as required by item (i) of Proposition 3. The MPM of Section 3 is an example 
of a SCR that satisﬁes the necessary condition for optimality in Proposition 5. The 
conditional expected probability assignment functions qi associated with the MPM � 1are given by (12), with ρi(x) = x (1−F(x |r )) f (r)dr for all x ∈ [0,1]. Fig. 4 shows 
the SCR associated with the MPM when there are n = 2 ﬁrms. The left-hand panel 
displays the chosen speciﬁcation-ﬁrm-pair for a given type s1 s.t. sA 
1 < sB 
1 and all 
possible types s2 of ﬁrm 2. The right-hand panel shows the chosen speciﬁcation-
ﬁrm-pair for given s1 s.t. s1 A > s
1 
B and all s
2 ∈ S. The shaded grey areas in both 
panels of Fig. 4 highlight all types s2 s.t. the MPM, for given s1, fails to select the 
efﬁcient speciﬁcation. This raises the question if there exist implementable DRMs 
that select the efﬁcient speciﬁcation for all type-vectors s ∈ Sn, and if so, whether 
such a DRM may, in fact, be optimal. We address this question in the next section. 
6 Optimality vs efﬁciency 
While a full characterization of optimal (i.e. expenditure-minimal) DRMs has 
proved difﬁcult to obtain, we can show that no optimal DRM will deliver an ef­
ﬁcient speciﬁcation choice for every type-vectors s ∈ Sn. This means that the buyer 
will have to decide at the outset whether to forego efﬁciency in order to reduce his 
expected payment for the good, or to accept the inevitability of higher expenditure 
in return for a guaranteed efﬁcient speciﬁcation choice. Before exploring more for­
mally this trade-off between efﬁciency and optimality, we start by deﬁning efﬁcient 
SCRs: 
Deﬁnition 9. A SCR Q is efﬁcient if ∀s ∈ Sn: ∑i∈I sAi < ∑i∈I sBi ⇒ ∑i∈I QiA(s) = 1, 
and ∑i∈I siA > ∑i∈I s
i
B ⇒ ∑i∈I QBi (s) = 1. 
� 
� � 
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Figure 4: SCR associated with MPM in correlated symmetric setting with n = 2 
ﬁrms 
In order to show that efﬁcient and implementable DRMs exist in our setup, 
consider the following SCR Qˆ that selects by means of a random device a supplier 
to produce the efﬁcient speciﬁcation. I.e. for all i ∈ I and all k, l ∈ K, l =� k: 
λi if ∑i∈I sk
i < ∑i∈I si Qˆik(s) ≡ 0 if ∑i∈I sik > ∑i∈I s
l
i
l 
where λi denotes the probability that ﬁrm i is chosen to produce the efﬁcient spec­
iﬁcation, with 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1, ∑i∈I λi = 1. Now consider the payment scheme Tˆ under 
which each ﬁrm i receives a constant amount Tˆi equal to the expected production 
cost of the boundary type si = 1 under SCR Qˆ : Tˆi(s) ≡ λicˆi(1) for all s ∈ Sn, where 
ci(1) = E ∑k∈K Qk
i (1,s−i)Ck(1,s−i) . We can show: k 
Proposition 8. The efﬁcient DRM (Qˆ, Tˆ ) is incentive compatible and individually 
rational. 
The proof is omitted as the result follows immediately from the fact that 
if all other ﬁrms report truthfully their types s−i, then ﬁrm i minimizes expected 
production cost by reporting truthfully its own type. This is because each ﬁrm 
has a positive chance of being chosen to produce the efﬁcient speciﬁcation. By 
misrepresenting its type, ﬁrm i faces a positive chance of having to produce the 
more costly speciﬁcation. This is not proﬁtable as each ﬁrm’s payment is constant. 
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Figure 5: Efﬁcient SCR Q¯ in correlated symmetric setting with n = 2 ﬁrms 
Observe that the efﬁcient DRM (Qˆ, Tˆ ) does not satisfy the necessary condition for 
expenditure-minimization in Proposition 5, as each ﬁrm has a positive chance of 
being chosen to supply the efﬁcient speciﬁcation regardless of whether its minimum 
signal pertains to the efﬁcient speciﬁcation or not. 
We now address the question whether an optimal DRM can ever be efﬁcient 
in the sense of Deﬁnition 9. From Section 5 on expenditure minimization we know 
that, within the class of all implementable DRMs, an expenditure-minimal DRM 
must display the property in Proposition 5, by which no ﬁrm is chosen to supply the 
speciﬁcation associated with its maximum signal. Therefore, if an optimal DRM is 
efﬁcient, the SCR associated with it must be both efﬁcient and display the necessary 
property for expenditure-minimization in Proposition 5. However, as we show now, 
such SCRs exist only in correlated symmetric settings with n = 2 ﬁrms. It follows 
immediately that in all other settings, no optimal DRM will be efﬁcient. To see that 
efﬁciency and the necessary condition in Proposition 5 are compatible only in very 
special cases, consider the SCR Q¯ in Fig. 5. It is obvious that Q¯ is efﬁcient and 
satisﬁes the condition in Proposition 5. To see that Q¯ is also incentive compatible, 
note that it gives rise to expected probability assignment functions q¯i of the form in 
Proposition 6, with ρ¯i(x) = 1/2 for all x ∈ [0,1]. We can show furthermore: 
Proposition 9. In correlated symmetric settings with n = 2 ﬁrms, the only efﬁcient 
SCR that satisﬁes the necessary condition for expenditure-minimization in Proposi­
¯tion 5 is Q in Fig. 5. 
� � � � 
Observe that incentive compatibility of the efﬁcient SCR Q¯ relies crucially 
on symmetry w.r.t. speciﬁcations. If the type-distribution is not symmetric around 
the 45◦-line, the two events in the left-hand panel of Fig. 5 where ﬁrm 1 is chosen 
to produce speciﬁcation A (labeled by “A1”) will no longer generate an expected 
probability assignment function qA
1 (s1) that is constant for all s1 s.t. sA 
1 < sB
1 . In 
particular, it will hold that ∂ q¯1 A(s
1)/∂ s1 B =� ∂ q¯1 B(s1)/∂ siA = 0, which constitutes a 
violation of incentive compatibility.24 Note furthermore that the construction in 
Fig. 5 does not generalize to settings with three or more ﬁrms, even if the type-
distribution is symmetric. To see this, let n = 3. Suppose that sA 
1 < sB 
1 and deﬁne 
s¯A ≡ s2 A + s3 A and s¯B ≡ s2 B + s3 B. Speciﬁcation A is efﬁcient if s¯B > (sA 1 − s1 B)+ s¯A. 
Otherwise, speciﬁcation B is efﬁcient. In this case, the necessary condition for 
expenditure-minimization in Proposition 5 requires that ﬁrm 1 not be chosen as 
sA 
1 < sB
1 . Now adapt as follows the construction of Q¯ in Fig. 5: Apart from events 
Σ ≡ (s¯A, s¯B) : (sA 1 − sB1 )+ s¯A < s¯B < s¯A and Σˆ ≡ (s¯A, s¯B) : s¯B > (sB 1 − sA1 )+ s¯A , 
ﬁrm 1’s probability of being chosen is zero. In events Σ and Σˆ, choose with equal 
probability among all ﬁrms whose minimum signals pertains to speciﬁcation A. 
This means that ﬁrm 1 is chosen with positive probability, but the precise magni­
tude of this probability depends on the realizations of types s2 and s3 of the other 
ﬁrms. In particular, in event Σ there can be at most one other ﬁrm whose minimum 
signal pertains to A, so that ﬁrm 1 is chosen to supply speciﬁcation A either with 
probability 1 or with probability 1/2. In event Σˆ there is at least one other ﬁrm 
whose minimum signal pertains to A, so that ﬁrm 1 is chosen to supply speciﬁca­
tion A either with probability 1/2 or with probability 1/3. Consequently, ﬁrm 1’s 
expected probability of being chosen differs across the events Σ and Σˆ. It is not hard 
to verify that q1 A(s
1), given by Pr{(s¯A, s¯B) ∈ Σ ∪ Σˆ}, violates the necessary condi­
tion for incentive compatibility in footnote 24. In summary, apart from correlated 
symmetric settings with two ﬁrms, there exists no incentive compatible SCR that is 
both efﬁcient and satisﬁes the necessary condition for expenditure-minimization in 
Proposition 5. 
We now turn to correlated symmetric settings with two ﬁrms. Here, we need 
to address the question if the efﬁcient SCR Q¯ in Fig. 5 can ever be optimal overall, 
i.e. minimize expenditure within the class of all implementable SCRs. To show that 
the answer to this question is No, observe that if Q¯ is expenditure-minimal overall, 
it also has to be expenditure-minimal within the restricted class of efﬁcient SCRs. 
However, it is not hard to show that Q¯ is not expenditure-minimal in this restricted 
class, because the efﬁcient DRM (Qˆ, Tˆ ) (with λ1 = λ2 = 1/2) generates lower ex 
24By item (i) of Proposition 3, incentive compatibility requires q¯i to be conservative. A necessary 
condition for qi to be conservative is that ∂ q¯A
i (si)/∂ sBi = ∂ q¯Bi (si)/∂ sA
i = 0 ∀i ∈ I and ∀si ∈ S at which 
q¯i is differentiable (see Theorem 1.2 in chapter VII,§1, of Lang, 1987). 
� � 
� � 
ante expenditure than the efﬁcient DRM featuring SCR Q¯ in Fig. 5. This can be 
seen from a comparison of ex ante expenditure under these two efﬁcient DRMs, 
which amounts to a comparison of the ﬁrms’ information rents under Qˆ and Q¯.25 
Under Qˆ (with λ1 = λ2 = 1/2), the conditional expected probability assignment 
functions qˆi are: 
qˆA
i (si) = 12
1 (1 −
i
π
) 
B(si)) if s
i
A
i < s
i
B
i 
and qˆB
i (si) = 21
1 πB(si) if s
i
A
i < s
i
B
i 
πA(s if sA > s 2 (1 − πA(si)) if sA > s2 B B 
where πA(si) denotes the probability that speciﬁcation A is efﬁcient when ﬁrm i’s 
type is s.t. siA > sB
i , and πB(si) denotes the probability that speciﬁcation B is efﬁcient 
when ﬁrm i’s type is s.t. siA < s
i
B. Now ﬁx any type s
i with sik < s
i
l (k, l ∈ K, l =� k) 
and compute ﬁrm i’s information rents under Q¯ and Qˆ, resp:26 
1 1 1 
Γ(si ,1) 
q¯idα = 
2
(1 − sik) > 
Γ(si ,1) 
qˆidα = 
2
(1 − ski ) − 2πl(s
i)(sl
i − sik) 
This comparison shows that for any given type si, SCR Q¯ awards each ﬁrm higher 
information rents than Qˆ. Consequently, ex ante expenditure is lower under (Qˆ, Tˆ ) 
(with λ1 = λ2 = 1/2) than under an efﬁcient DRM featuring SCR Q¯. We can there­
fore conclude that any DRM that is optimal among all implementable DRMs (and 
therefore generates ex ante expenditure at least as low as an expenditure-minimal 
efﬁcient DRM) cannot involve SCR Q¯ in Fig. 5. But since Q¯, as stated in Proposi­
tion 9, is the only efﬁcient SCR to satisfy the necessary condition for expenditure-
minimization in Proposition 5, it follows that even in correlated symmetric settings 
with two ﬁrms an optimal DRM will not be efﬁcient. 
At this point, it may be helpful to offer an intuition for why the condition in 
Proposition 5 is necessary for expenditure-minimization among all implementable 
DRMs, but is not necessary when attention is restricted to the class of efﬁcient 
DRMs. Recall that Proposition 5 was established by partially minimizing point-
wise ex ante expenditure in (11) in the absence of any constraints on the SCRs 
considered. However, when looking for an expenditure-minimal efﬁcient SCR, ex 
ante expenditure in (11) must be minimized subject to the ex post constraint of 
25Recall that in an implementable DRM, the buyer’s expenditure consists of two components. 
The ﬁrst is a reimbursement of (expected) production cost, and the second is the ﬁrms’ information 
rents. The information rents under Qˆ and Q¯ can be computed as path-integrals of the conditional 
expected probability assignment functions qˆi and q¯i, resp. The reimbursement of production cost 
is, of course, the same under any two efﬁcient DRMs, so that any difference in ex ante expenditure 
between two efﬁcient DRMs is driven solely by the different levels of information rents. 
26If k = A and l = B, we use integration-path Γ2 in Fig. 3 to compute ﬁrm i’s information rents 
under Qˆ and Q¯, while for k = B and l = A we use Γ1. 
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Figure 6: Ex ante expenditure under MPM and the SCRs Qˆ and Q¯ for 25 Beta-
distributions 
efﬁcient speciﬁcation choice. Fig. 5 shows that within this restricted class, the de­
cision to select at every type-pair (s1 ,s2) in the interior of S2 the supplier whose 
minimum signal pertains to the efﬁcient speciﬁcation (as required by the condition 
in Proposition 5) determines fully the choice of supplier at all associated type-pairs 
((sk
i ,1),s−i) on the boundary of S2 (for all k ∈ K and i = 1,2). Therefore, when 
minimizing (11) subject to efﬁciency constraints, the values of the SCR Q at in­
terior type-pairs cannot be chosen independently of the values of Q at boundary 
type-pairs. This contrasts with the partial pointwise minimization of (11) in the ab­
sence of a restriction to efﬁcient SCRs (as in the proof of Proposition 5). There, any 
decision as to which ﬁrm supplies each speciﬁcation at interior type-pairs does not 
restrict the choice of supplier for type-pairs on the boundary. Consequently, while 
the condition in Proposition 5 is necessary for pointwise minimization of (11) in the 
absence of ex post constraints on Q, it is not necessary for expenditure-minimization 
within the class of efﬁcient SCRs. 
To conclude this section, we provide a numerical comparison of ex ante ex­
penditure under the MPM (which satisﬁes the necessary condition for expenditure 
minimization in Proposition 5) and the efﬁcient SCRs Qˆ (with λ1 = λ2 = 1/2) and 
Q¯. For our simulations, the results of which are displayed in Fig. 6, we restrict 
ourselves to the independent symmetric case (i.e. f (sA,sB) = h(sA)h(sB)) where 
the distribution H is given by 25 different Beta-distributions.27 While we do not 
know if the MPM is an optimal DRM, our numerical comparisons reveal that the 
MPM performs better than the efﬁcient DRM (Qˆ, Tˆ ) for all 25 Beta-distributions, 
and does particularly well for those distributions that concentrate probability mass 
on low cost signals (such as the Beta-distribution β15 with parameters a = 1 and 
b = 5), where the MPM generates a level of ex ante expenditure that is less than 
50% of expenditure associated with efﬁcient DRM (Qˆ, Tˆ ). The advantage of the 
MPM over (Qˆ, Tˆ ) becomes less pronounced for Beta-distributions that concentrate 
probability mass on high cost-signals (e.g. under the Beta-distribution β51, where 
ex ante expenditure in the MPM reaches approx. 98% of ex ante expenditure under 
Qˆ). 
7 Conclusion 
We have introduced a simple common-value procurement model in which both the 
speciﬁcation and the price of the good matter. We have shown that the minimum 
price mechanism, which is a very natural procurement procedure, is both inefﬁ­
cient and involves lower (expected) expenditure than efﬁcient mechanisms in many 
settings. The main technical contribution of this paper was to suggest a pragmatic 
approach for taking account of incentive compatibility constraints in mechanism de­
sign settings with multi-dimensional private information. In future work, we plan 
to explore if the techniques developed here can also be useful in other mechanism 
design settings with multi-dimensional private information. 
8 Appendix 
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1. 
We have to show that if a strategy (δi, pA
i , pB
i ) in the MPM satisﬁes properties P1­
P3, then the pricing function pA
i fully determines the pricing function pB
i . Assume 
(w.l.o.g.) that the speciﬁcation choice rule δi is as shown in either panel of Fig. 
1. Now consider any type sˆi s.t. δi(sˆiA, sˆ
i
B) = B. By P2, this type quotes the price 
piB(sˆ
i
B). Now note that there exists a type s˜
i, with s˜iA = Xi
−1(sˆiB) and s˜
i
B = sˆ
i
B, who 
is indifferent between offering speciﬁcation A or B. Property P2 implies that if 
speciﬁcation A is offered by type s˜i, the quoted price will be piA(s˜
i
A) = pA(Xi
−1(sˆiB)). 
27We have generated these 25 distributions by letting each of the two parameters that characterize 
the Beta-distribution take all integer values between 1 and 5. 
If, instead, speciﬁcation B is offered, the quoted price will be pB
i (sˆB
i ). By P3, these 
two prices must be the same. Therefore, piB(sˆ
i
B) = p
i
A(X
−1(sˆiB)). 
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2. 
The proof consists of three steps. In Step 1, we show that there exist symmetric 
equilibria that feature a nondecreasing pricing function pA. In Step 2, we show that 
a symmetric equilibrium pricing function pA must, in fact, be increasing. In Step 3, 
we ﬁnally show that pA(x) is differentiable at every x ∈ [0,min{X−1(1),1}], with 
the exception of x = X−1(0). 
Step 1. We show here that the game induced by the MPM in Section 3.1 satisﬁes 
the single crossing condition for games of incomplete information (SCC). The SCC 
(see Deﬁnition 3 in Athey, 2001) ensures that if each ﬁrm j uses a nondecreasing 
function to generate the price for its chosen speciﬁcation, then there exists a best 
response where ﬁrm i (i =� j) also uses a nondecreasing function to generate its price 
quote. We may then look for a symmetric equilibrium of the MPM in which all 
ﬁrms use the same nondecreasing pricing functions. To show that SCC is satisﬁed, 
we have to prove that ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt Πi(pi;sk
i ) from offering the good in 
speciﬁcation δi(si) = k at price pi satisﬁes the single crossing differences property 
(SCD) when the strategy (δ , pA, pB) used by all other ﬁrms features nondecreasing 
pricing functions pA and pB.28 Assuming that (δ , pA, pB) satisﬁes properties P1-P3, 
and (w.l.o.g.) that δ is based on a function X s.t. X−1(0) ≥ 0 (as illustrated in Fig. 
1), each ﬁrm j uses a nondecreasing function pA to generate its price if δ (s j) = A, 
and the nondecreasing function pA(X−1( )) to generate its price if δ (s j) = B. To ·
iobtain an expression for ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt Πi(pi;sk) we need to identify, for 
each competitor j, the events in which the price quoted by j is no lower than pi: 
(i) Firm j offers the good in speciﬁcation A: δ (sA
j 
,sB
j 
) = A sB
j 
> X(sA
j 
). The 
j 
⇔ 
j iprice pA(sA) quoted by ﬁrm j is no lower than ﬁrm i’s price p
i: pA(sA) ≥ p . 
(ii) Firm j offers the good in speciﬁcation B: δ (sA
j 
,sB
j 
) = B sA
j 
> X−1(sB
j 
). The ⇔ 
price pB(sB
j 
) quoted by ﬁrm j is no lower than ﬁrm i’s price pi: pB(sB
j 
) ≥ pi . 
Now deﬁne for each speciﬁcation k ∈ K a function sˇk : R+ →
i i 
R+, p �→ 
sˇk(p), with sˇk(p) ≡ inf{sk ∈ [0,1] : pk(sk) ≥ p}. The value sˇk represents the lowest 
k-signal s.t. ﬁrm j’s price for speciﬁcation k is no lower than some given price p. 
Note that each sˇk is nondecreasing, with sˇk(p) = 0 for all p ≤ pk(0). Assuming 
28For a deﬁnition of SCD, see chapter 4.1 of Milgrom (2004). 
� 
� 
� 
that each pricing function pk is bounded, we also have sˇk(p) = ∞ for all p above 
the upper bound of pk.29 Formally, the event that ﬁrm j’s price is no lower than 
ﬁrm i’s price pi is: Ω(pi) ≡ {s j ∈ S : sAj > sˇA(pi),sBj > X(sAj )} ∪ {s j ∈ S : sBj > 
sˇB(pi),sA
j 
> X−1(sB
j 
)}. Firm i has positive probability of winning the contract iff 
all competitors j =� i quote prices no lower than pi . This event can be described 
by the Cartesian product Ω(pi) × . . .× Ω(pi) across the n − 1 competitors. To ease 
notation, let Ω(pi)n−1 ≡ Ω(pi)× . . .×Ω(pi). Having identiﬁed the events where all 
competitors charge a price no lower than pi, we need to account for the possibility 
that, rather than winning outright, ﬁrm i’s price pi ties with the prices of one or 
more competitors. For this purpose, deﬁne for every i ∈ I a tie-breaking function 
Θi : Rn [0,1] s.t. Θi(p1 , . . . , pn) = 1 if pi < min j=i p j, and Θi(p1 , . . . , pn) ∈ (0,1)+ → �
1if pi ties with the price of at least one competitor. Otherwise, Θi(p , . . . , pn) = 0. 
We can now write as follows ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt from offering speciﬁcation k 
at price pi:30 
i;si i i k
i ,s−iΠi(p k) ≡ 
Ω(pi)n−1 
Θi(p ,p−i(s−i))(p −Ck(s k ))g(s−i)ds−i (A.1) 
Now deﬁne Ψ(sik) ≡ Πi(pˆi;sik) − Πi(p˜i;sik) for any two prices pˆi > p˜i quoted 
by ﬁrm i for its chosen speciﬁcation k. We say that Πi(pi;sk
i ) satisﬁes SCD if for 
all sˆik > s˜
i
k: Ψ(s˜
i
k) > 0 ⇒ Ψ(sˆik) > 0 and Ψ(s˜ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ Ψ(sˆik) ≥ 0. Suppose that 
Ψ(s˜ik) ≥ 0. Then, if Πi(pi;sik) satisﬁes SCD, it must hold that Ψ(sˆik) − Ψ(s˜ik) ≥ 0 
for any sˆk
i > s˜k
i . We can express the difference Ψ(sˆk
i ) − Ψ(s˜ki ) as follows: 
Θi(p˜i ,p−i(s−i))( sˆik − s˜ik)g(s−i)ds−i 
Ω(p˜i)n−1 
− 
Ω(pˆi)n−1 
Θi(pˆi ,p−i(s−i))( sˆk
i − s˜ik)g(s−i)ds−i 
As sˇk(p˜i) ≤ sˇ(pˆi) for all k ∈ K, it holds that Ω(pˆi) ⊆ Ω(p˜i). We can therefore 
partition the set Ω(p˜i) into the disjoint subsets Ω(pˆi) and Ω(p˜i)\Ω(pˆi).31 We can 
29This follows from the fact that inf∅ = ∞. 
30We write p−i(s−i) ≡ (p1 k1 , . . . , pik−i−
1
1 
, pik
+
i+
1
1 
, . . . , pnkn ) for the vector of prices quoted by ﬁrms j =� i 
for their respective speciﬁcations, chosen according to the speciﬁcation choice rule δ . I.e. k j = 
δ (s j). 
31This set is {s j ∈ S : sˇA(p˜i) < sAj < sˇA(pˆi),sBj > X(sAj )}∪ {s j ∈ S : sˇB(p˜i) < sBj < sˇB(pˆi),sAj > 
X−1(sB
j )}. 
� 
� �	 � 
� 
� 
+	
�
� 
now write the difference Ψ(sˆk
i ) − Ψ(s˜ki ) as: 
Θi(p˜i ,p−i(s−i))( sˆik − s˜ik)g(s−i)ds−i

Ω(p˜i)n−1\Ω(pˆi)n−1

+	 Θi(p˜i ,p−i(s−i)) − Θi(pˆi ,p−i(s−i)) (sˆik − s˜ik)g(s−i)ds−i (A.2)
Ω(pˆi)n−1 
It is easy to see that the ﬁrst term in (A.2) is nonnegative: while the integrand 
is always positive, the set Ω(p˜i)n−1\Ω(pˆi)n−1 may be empty.32 To see that the 
second term in (A.2) is nonnegative, observe that we are integrating over all type-
vectors s−i s.t. each competitor’s price is no lower than pˆi . For p˜i < pˆi we have 
Θi(p˜i ,p−i(s−i)) = 1, and therefore Θi(p˜i ,p−i(s−i)) − Θi(pˆi ,p−i(s−i)) ≥ 0 for all 
s−i ∈ Ω(pˆi)n−1. We can conclude that Ψ(s˜ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ Ψ(sˆik) ≥ 0, which implies that 
Πi(pi;sk
i ) satisﬁes SCD, as required. 
Step 2. We show by contradiction that a symmetric equilibrium (δ , pA, pB) in 
the space of nondecreasing strategies must feature an increasing pricing function 
pA. Suppose, instead, that there exist x˜, xˆ with 0 ≤ x˜ < xˆ ≤ min{X−1(1),1} s.t. 
pA(x) = pˆA for all x ∈ (x˜, xˆ), pA(x) < pˆA if x < x˜, and pA(x) > pˆA if x > xˆ. Note 
that sˇA(pˆA) = x˜, that limε 0 sˇA(pˆA − ε) = x˜, and that limε 0 sˇA(pˆA + ε) = xˆ. Now ↓
i	
↓
+consider ﬁrm i with A-signal sA = x ∈ (x˜, xˆ). Denoting by pˆA the price for which 
+sˇ(pˆA ) = xˆ, we can write ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt Πi(pˆA;x) as follows: 
Θi(pˆA,p−i(s−i))(pˆA −CA(x,s−A i))g(s−i)ds−i +Ω(pˆA)n−1\Ω(pˆA )n−1 
+	
Ω(pˆA )n−1 
(pˆA −CA(x,s−A i))g(s−i)ds−i (A.3)+ 
The ﬁrst integral in (A.3) is over type-vectors s−i s.t. at least one ﬁrm j = i has a 
type s j in Ω(pˆA)\Ω(pˆA ).33 This means that at least one competitor quotes the same 
+price pˆA as ﬁrm i, and therefore Θi(pˆA,p−i(s−i)) < 1 for all s−i ∈ Ω(pˆA)n−1\Ω(pˆA )n−1. 
The second integral in (A.3) is over type-vectors s−i s.t. every competitor’s price 
+exceeds pˆA , which means that ﬁrm i wins outright. Now suppose that ﬁrm i deviates 
to some price pˆA − ε , which yields expected proﬁt: 
Πi(pˆA − ε;x) = 
Ω(sˇA(pˆA−ε))n−1 
(pˆA − ε −CA(x,s−A i))g(s−i)ds−i 
32This happens if the pricing function pA displays a jump discontinuity, in which case sˇA(p˜i) = 
sˇA(pˆi). 
33This set is given by {s j ∈ S : x˜ < sAj < xˆ,sBj > X(sAj )}∪{s j ∈ S : sˇB(pˆA) < sBj < sˇB(pˆ+ A ),sAj > 
X−1(sB
j )}. 
� 
� 
� 
In the limit as ε 0:↓ 
limΠi(pˆA − ε;x) = (pˆA −CA(x,s−A i))g(s−i)ds−i (13)+ε↓0 Ω(pˆA)n−1\Ω(pˆA )n−1 
+ 
Ω(pˆA )n−1 
(pˆA −CA(x,s−A i))g(s−i)ds−i + 
The proﬁt-gain limε 0 Πi(pˆA − ε;x) − Πi(pˆA;x) from this deviation is: ↓
[1 − Θi(pˆA,p−i(s−i))](pˆA −CA(x,s−A i))g(s−i)ds−i Ω(pˆA)n−1\Ω(pˆ+ A )n−1 
+which is positive as Θi(pˆA,p−i(s−i)) < 1 for all s−i ∈ Ω(pˆA)n−1\Ω(pˆA )n−1. This 
establishes the desired contradiction. We can therefore conclude that the equilib­
rium pricing function pA must be increasing. 
We can show furthermore that the equilibrium pricing function pA must 
be continuous everywhere in its domain [0,min{X−1(1),1}]. To see this, note 
ﬁrst that an increasing function pA can only display jump discontinuities. Sup­
pose now that pA is continuous everywhere, with the exception of a point s¯A ∈
+ +(X−1(0),min{X−1(1),1}). At s¯A let p−A (s¯A) < pA (s¯A), where p−A (s¯A) and pA (s¯A) 
denote the right-hand and left-hand limit of pA as sA ↑ s¯A and sA ↓ s¯A, resp. We 
now ask: at which value s¯B does the pricing function pB( ) = pA(X−1( )) fea­· ·
ture a jump discontinuity, and what size is the jump? To answer this question, 
note that pB is deﬁned on the interval [0,min{1,X(1)}]. At sB = 0 it holds that 
pB(0) = pA(X−1(0)), while at sB = min{1,X(1)} it holds that pB(min{1,X(1)}) = 
pA(min{X−1(1),1}). Finally, observe that in the limit as sB ↑ X(s¯A), we have 
p−B (X( ¯ A ( ¯ X( ¯ B (X( ¯ A (s¯A).sA)) = p
− sA), and in the limit as sB ↓ sA), we have p+ sA)) = p+ 
We can therefore conclude that pB is continuous everywhere in [0,min{1,X(1)}], 
with the exception of the point s¯B = X(s¯A), and that the size of the jump at this point 
is p+ B (X(s¯A)) − p−B (X(s¯A)) = p+ A (s¯A) − pA−(s¯A). Therefore, the size in the jump of 
pB at X(s¯A) is equal to the size of the jump in pA at s¯A. 
We now show by contradiction that the equilibrium pricing function pA 
cannot display a jump discontinuity at s¯A. To see this, consider ﬁrm i who of­
fers speciﬁcation A, and suppose its A-signal is siA = s¯A − ε . In the limit as ε ↓ 0, 
the pricing function pA prescribes a price of p−A (s¯A). With this price, we obtain 
thresholds sˇA(pA
−(s¯A)) = s¯A and sˇB(pA
−(s¯A)) = X(s¯A). The set Ω(pA
−(s¯A))n−1 cap­
tures all type-vectors s−i s.t. ﬁrm i wins the contract. Now suppose ﬁrm i deviates 
+to the price pA (s¯A). Due to the identical right-hand and left-hand limits of pA and 
+pB at their respective points of discontinuity, it follows that sˇA(pA (s¯A)) = s¯A and 
+ +sˇB(pA (s¯A)) = X(s¯A), and therefore Ω(pA (s¯A))
n−1 = Ω(pA
−(s¯A))n−1. Consequently, 
+when quoting pA (s¯A), ﬁrm i still wins against the same competitor-types s
−i as with 
� � 
� � 
+the lower price p−A (s¯A). However, with price pA (s¯A), ﬁrm i has strictly higher ex­
pected proﬁt than with p−A (s¯A), which makes this a proﬁtable deviation. Therefore, 
pA is continuous everywhere in [X−1(0),min{X−1(1),1}]. It is easy to argue that 
pA must also be continuous in the remainder of its domain. 
Step 3. In this ﬁnal step of the proof of Lemma 2, we show that an increasing 
equilibrium pricing function pA is a.e. differentiable on [0,1). Suppose ﬁrm i’s of­
fers speciﬁcation is A, and that its A-signal sA
i is in (X−1(0),1). Due to the additive 
nature of the cost function CA in (1), we can write Πi(pA(sA
i ); sA
i ) as 
� i j

Ω(sA
i )n−1 
pA(sA
i ) − s
n
A − ∑ 
s
n
k g(s−i)ds−i

= ω(sA
i )n−1 
� 
pA(siA) − 
siA + 
j
n 
=� i 
− 1
E[sA 
��sA > siA,sB > X(sAi )] � (A.4)n n 
where Ω(siA) ≡{(sA,sB) ∈ S : sA > siA,sB > X(siA)} and ω(siA)= 
� 
s
1 
A
i 
� 
X
1 
(si f (sA,sB)dsAdsB. A) 
The term ω(sA
i ) represents the probability that any given competitor charges a price 
higher than pA(sA
i ). Now take x,y s.t. X−1(0) < x < y < 1. In a symmetric equilib­
rium, type y must prefer the price pA(y) to the price pA(x): 
Πi(p(y);y) − Πi(p(x);y) ≥ 0 (A.5) 
Similarly, type x must prefer the price p(x) to the price p(y): 
Πi(p(x);x) − Πi(p(y);x) ≥ 0 (A.6) 
Setting P(sA
i ) ≡ pA(sAi )ω(sAi )n−1, the proﬁt difference in (A.5) can be written as: 
n(P(y) − P(x)) y � 
ω(y)n−1 
� 
n − 1 ≥ n − 1 − ω(x)
n−1
+ ω(y)n−1E[sA |sA > y,sB > X(y)] 
− ω(x)n−1E[sA |sA > x,sB > X(x)] (A.7) 
The right-hand side of (A.7) is a lower bound on n−
n 
1 (P(y) − P(x)). Now note that 
the terms in the second and third line of (A.7) can be written as: 
E[sA |sA > y,sB > X(y)] ω(y)n−1 − ω(x)n−1
+ ω(x)n−1 (E[sA |sA > y,sB > X(y)] − E[sA |sA > x,sB > X(x)]) 
� �
��

�
 �
����

� 
�

After dividing both sides of (A.7) by y − x, the lower bound on the right-hand side 
of (A.7) becomes: 
ω(y)n−1 − ω(x)n−1y 
n − 1 + E[sA |sA > y,sB > X(y)] 
sA > y,sB > X(y)] − E[sA 
y − x

+ ω(x)n−1 
E[sA | |
sA > x,sB > X(x)] (A.8)

y − x

i 
A)
n−1 and E[sA i i A,sB > X(sAs ω(s
 A)] are integrals, they are both differen­
tiable. Therefore, in the limit as y x the expression in (A.8) converges to: 
sA > s
↓

(A.9)

y=x 
d x 
ω(y)n−1 + E[sA |sA > y,sB > X(y)]ω(y)n−1 dy n − 1

Using similar steps, we can show that the upper bound on n−
n 
1 (P(y) − P(x)) im­
plied by (A.6) also converges to the limit in (A.9) as y x. Therefore, the term 
n n 
↓ 
n−1 (P(y) − P(x)) converges to n−1 P(x)�, which implies that the derivative p�A(x) 
exists. While the above argument pertains to x ∈ (X−1(0),1), it is straightfor­
ward to show that pA(x) is differentiable also for all x ∈ [0,X−1(0)). However, 
for such values x the probability that any given competitor charges a price higher 
than pA(x) is given by ω(x) = 1 − FA(x), which will result in a derivative pA� (x) for 
x < X−1(0) that is different from the derivative p�A(x) derived above for x > X
−1(0). 
Therefore, while continuous everywhere, the function pA is not differentiable at 
x = X−1(0). 
8.3 Proof of Lemma 3. 
Suppose all n ﬁrms use a strategy (δ , pA, pB) that satisﬁes properties P1-P3. Now 
consider a ﬁrm i with type si s.t. siA = x < 1 and s
i
B = X(x). By P3, ﬁrm i’s equi­
librium price quote is pA(x) = pB(X(x)), regardless of the speciﬁcation it chooses. 
Therefore, the event that any given competitor charges a price higher than the price 
of ﬁrm i is Ω(x) ≡ {(sA,sB) ∈ S : sA > x,sB > X(x)}. 
wins the contract is then given by ω(x) = 
The probability that ﬁrm i

Ω(x) f (sA,sB)d(sA,sB), regardless of the 
speciﬁcation it chooses. Given the additive nature of the cost functions Ck in (1), 
and the fact that the ﬁrms’ types are independent random vectors, ﬁrm i’s expected 
cost of producing any speciﬁcation k ∈ K are: 
i f (sA,sB) 
ω(x)

d(sA,sB) 
s

ω(x)n−1 +(n − 1)ω(x)n−1 sk 
Ω(x) 
k 
n n

As we are looking to characterize the function X s.t. the expected production cost

of the two speciﬁcations are the same, we now subtract the expected cost of B from

��	 � � 
�	 � 
the expected cost of A. This yields the following equation, which deﬁnes implicitly 
the function X : 
(x − X(x))ω(x)n−1 
+ (n − 1)ω(x)n−2 
Ω(x) 
sA f (sA,sB)d(sA,sB) − 
It is easy to rewrite this equation in the form given in Lemma 3. 
Ω(x) 
sB f (sA,sB)d(sA,sB) = 0 
(A.10) 
8.4 Proof of Lemma 4. 
Suppose the density f is symmetric around the 45◦-line: f (sB,sA) = f (sA,sB) for 
all (sA,sB) ∈ S. We ﬁrst show that X(x) = x is a sufﬁcient condition for equation 
(A.10) in the proof of Lemma 3 to hold. Now ﬁx some x < 1. If X(x) = x, then 
(A.10) reduces to: � 1 � 1	 � 1 � 1 
sA f (sA,sB)dsBdsA − sB f (sA,sB)dsBdsA = 0 
x x x x 
First consider the ﬁrst double integral on the left-hand side. Note that we can change 
the order of integration. Next, consider the second double integral, and note that we 
can arbitrarily re-label the integration indices. In particular, re-label sA as sB, and 
vice versa. We can therefore equivalently write the left-hand side as: � 1 � 1 
sA[ f (sA,sB) − f (sB,sA)]dsAdsB 
x x 
Symmetry of f ensures that this expression is zero for every (sA,sB). The next step 
is to show that the condition X(x) = x is also necessary for equation (A.10) to hold. 
We show this by contradiction. Fix some x < 1, and suppose that (A.10) holds. 
Suppose also that x < X(x). In this case, the ﬁrst term of (A.10) is negative. Now 
consider the second term of (A.10). In particular, note that, due to the additivity of 
the double integral, we can write: 
sA f (sA,sB)d(sA,sB) − sB f (sA,sB)d(sA,sB)
Ω(x) Ω(x) � X(x) � 1 
= (sA − sB) f (sA,sB)dsBdsA 
x X(x) � 1 � 1	 � 1 � 1 
+	 sA f (sA,sB)dsBdsA − sB f (sA,sB)dsBdsA 
X(x) X(x) X(x) X(x) 
�	 � 
We can change the order of integration in the second double integral. Also, in the 
third double integral, we can re-label sA as sB, and vice versa. This yields: � X(x) � 1 
(sA − sB) f (sA,sB)dsBdsA 
x X(x) � 1 � 1 
+	 sA[ f (sA,sB) − f (sB,sA)]dsAdsB 
X(x) X(x) 
By symmetry of f this expression reduces to:34 � X(x) � 1 
(sA − sB) f (sA,sB)dsBdsA < 0 
x X(x) 
We can conclude that if x < X(x), then the expected cost difference in (A.10) is neg­
ative, which yields the desired contradiction. An analogous argument establishes 
that the expected cost difference in (A.10) is positive if x > X(x). Therefore, it must 
be the case that X(x) = x for all x ∈ [0,1). By continuity, X(1) = 1. 
8.5 Proof of Lemma 5. 
The proof proceeds in three steps. In Step 1 we show that X(x) ≤ x. In Step 2, we 
prove that X(1) = 1, and in Step 3 we show that the derivative of X is positive. 
Step 1. Assume that HB f.o.s.d. HA, which implies that EB[sB |sB ≥ x ] ≥ EA[sA |sA ≥ x ] 
for all x ∈ [0,1). We now show by contradiction that X(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0,1). We 
start from the premise that equation (A.10) in the proof of Lemma 3 is satisﬁed for 
sA
i = x < 1. Suppose now that X(x) > x, which implies that the ﬁrst term on the 
left-hand side of (A.10) is negative. Now consider the second term, noting that: 
sA f (sA,sB)d(sA,sB) − sB f (sA,sB)d(sA,sB)
Ω(x) Ω(x) � x �� 1 � � 1 �� 1 � 
= sAhA(sA)dsA hB(sB)dsB + sAhA(sA)dsA hB(sB)dsB 
X(x) x x x � 1 �� 1 � � 1 �� x � 
− 
x x 
sBhB(sB)dsB hA(sA)dsA − 
x X(x) 
sBhB(sB)dsB hA(sA)dsA 
This term can be expressed equivalently as: 
(1 − HA(x))(HB(x) − HB(X(x)))(EA[sA |sA ≥ x ] − EB[sB |X(x) ≤ sB ≤ x ]) 
+(1 − HA(x))(1 − HB(x))(EA[sA |sA ≥ x ] − EB[sB |sB ≥ x ]) (A.11) 
34It is straightforward to see that this expression is negative: With sA ∈ (s,X(s)) and sB ∈ (X(s), 1), 
it is obvious that sA − sB < 0 for every (sA,sB). 
� � 
As HB f.o.s.d. HA, it follows that the second line of (A.11) is non-positive. In 
the ﬁrst line of (A.11), the term EA[sA |sA ≥ x ] − EB[sB |X(x) ≤ sB ≤ x ] is positive 
given the assumption that X(x) > x, and therefore the ﬁrst line of (A.11) is negative. 
This, however, implies that both terms on the left-hand side of equation (A.10) 
are negative, which establishes a contradiction to our premise that equation (A.10) 
holds. An analogue argument establishes that if HA f.o.s.d. HB, then X(x) ≥ x for 
all x ∈ [0,1). 
Step 2. We now show that X(1) = 1. To see this, re-write equation (A.10) using 
the fact that in independent asymmetric settings: ω(x)= (1−HA(x))(1−HB(X(x)). 
Then substitute in the expression given in (A.11) above, and divide both sides of 
the resulting equation by (1 − HA(x))n−1. Easing notation by writing X instead of 
X(x), we obtain: 
(x − X)(1 − HB(X))n−1 
+(n − 1)(1 − HB(X))n−2 (1 − HB(x))(EA[sA |sA ≥ x ] − EB[sB |sB ≥ x ]) 
+(n − 1)(1 − HB(X))n−2 (HB(x) − HB(X))(EA[sA |sA ≥ x ] − EB[sB |X ≤ sB ≤ x ]) = 0 
When evaluated at x = 1, this expression reduces to: 
(1 − X)(1 − HB(X))n−1 +(n − 1)(1 − HB(X))n−1 (1 − EB[sB |sB ≥ X ]) = 0 
It is obvious that this equation holds iff X = 1, which establishes that X(1) = 1. 
Step 3. We show that X �(x) > 0. To see this, note that equation (A.10) can also 
be expressed as follows (again writing X instead of X(x) to ease notation): � 1 hA(sA) � 1 hB(sB)x − X +(n − 1) 
x 
sA 1 − HA(sA) dsA − (n − 1) X sB 1 − HB(sB) dsB = 0 
Using Leibniz’s rule to differentiate both sides of this equation w.r.t x, we obtain: 
1 +
(n 
1
−
− 
1
H
)
A
h
(
A
s
(
A
s
) 
A)
(EA[sA |sA ≥ x ] − x) 
− X �(x) 1 + (n 
1
−
− 
1
H
)
B
h
(
B
s
(
B
s
) 
B)
(EB[sB |sB ≥ X ] − X) = 0 
It is straightforward to solve for X �(x), which shows that X �(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [0,1]. 
8.6 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. 
The proof proceeds in three Steps. In Steps 1 and 2, we derive the equilibrium 
pricing functions in Prop. 2 from the ﬁrst-order condition (f.o.c.) for a maximum 
of the expected proﬁt of an arbitrary ﬁrm i. In Step 3, we then establish formally that 
the pricing functions obtained from the f.o.c. (and appropriate boundary conditions) 
together constitute a symmetric equilibrium of the MPM. 
Step 1. Suppose all n ﬁrms use the equilibrium speciﬁcation choice rule δ . Con­
sider ﬁrm i with type si s.t. si = x ≥ X−1(0) and sBi > X(x). I.e. ﬁrm i offers the A 
good in speciﬁcation A. Now consider ﬁrm i’s problem of which price to quote 
for speciﬁcation A, when all other ﬁrms use the equilibrium pricing functions pA 
and pB in (3) and (4), resp. Suppose that ﬁrm i, instead of submitting the price 
pA(x) = p¯(x), quotes some other price pˆ ≥ p¯(X−1(0)) for speciﬁcation A. Note that 
it does not pay for ﬁrm i to quote a price pˆ > p¯(1), because this means that ﬁrm i will 
never be chosen, resulting in a proﬁt of zero. The same outcome can be achieved by 
setting pˆ = p¯(1). Therefore, we only need to consider prices pˆ ∈ [p¯(X−1(0)), p¯(1)], 
which is equivalent to choosing a signal-value xˆ ∈ [X−1(0)),1] (where xˆ need not 
be equal to ﬁrm i’s A-signal x) and quoting the corresponding candidate equilibrium 
price p¯(xˆ) for speciﬁcation A. The expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i when its A-signal is x 
and it quotes the price p¯(xˆ) for speciﬁcation A is: � � 1 � 1 � 
Π¯i(xˆ;x) ≡ ω(xˆ)n−1 p¯(xˆ) − n
x − (n − 1) 
X(xˆ) xˆ
s
n
A f (
ω
sA
( 
,
xˆ
s
) 
B)dsAdsB (A.12) 
where ω(xˆ) = Pr{(sA,sB) ∈ Ω(xˆ)}, and Ω(xˆ) = {(sA,sB) ∈ S : sA > xˆ,sB > X(xˆ)}. 
Firm i solves maxxˆ Π¯i(xˆ;x), which yields the following f.o.c.: 
0 = p¯�(xˆ)ω(xˆ)n−1 +(n − 1)p¯(xˆ)(ω(xˆ))n−2 ω �(xˆ) 
+ 
n − 
n 
1
ω(xˆ)n−2 (x + xˆ+(n − 2)E[sA |(sA,sB) ∈ Ω(xˆ)]) 
� 
1 − FB|A (X(xˆ) |xˆ) 
� 
fA(xˆ)+ 
+ 
n − 
n 
1
ω(xˆ)n−2 (x + E[sA |sA > xˆ,sB = X(xˆ)])X �(xˆ) 
� 
1 − FA|B (xˆ |X(xˆ)) 
� 
fB(X(xˆ)) 
+ 
n − 
n 
1
ω(xˆ)n−2(n − 2)E[sA |(sA,sB) ∈ Ω(xˆ)]X �(xˆ) 
� 
1 − FA|B (xˆ |X(xˆ)) 
� 
fB(X(xˆ)) 
(A.13) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal value of xˆ = x, so setting xˆ = x in the f.o.c., 
� � 
� 
we obtain the differential equation: 
d − 
ds 
p¯(x)ω(x)n−1 
= 
n − 
n 
1
ω(x)n−2 (2x +(n − 2)E[sA |(sA,sB) ∈ Ω(x)]) 
� 
1 − FB|A (X(x) |x) 
� 
fA(x)+ 
+ 
n − 
n 
1
ω(x)n−2 (x + E[sA |sA > x,sB = X(x)])X �(x) 
� 
1 − FA|B (x |X(x)) 
� 
fB(X(x)) 
+ 
n − 
n 
1
ω(x)n−2(n − 2)E[sA |(sA,sB) ∈ Ω(x)]X �(x) 
� 
1 − FA|B (x |X(x)) 
� 
fB(X(x)) 
(A.14) 
We now derive a boundary condition associated with this differential equa­
tion. Suppose ﬁrm i’s type si is s.t. sA
i = 1 and sB
i = X(1). Conditional on winning 
(which occurs in the event that sA
j 
= sB
j 
= 1 for all j =� i), the production cost of 
each speciﬁcation is 1. Suppose ﬁrst that the equilibrium pricing function p¯ is s.t. 
p¯(1) > 1. In the event that ﬁrm i is awarded the contract, it has positive proﬁt. How­
ever, the probability that ﬁrm i is chosen with a price of p¯(1) is zero, and so ﬁrm i’s 
expected proﬁt is zero. Now consider the following deviation: ﬁrm i offers spec­
iﬁcation A at a price pˆ, with 1 < pˆ < p¯(1), which corresponds to the equilibrium 
price submitted by a type with A-signal p¯−1(pˆ)) < 1. Therefore, ﬁrm i’s expected 
proﬁt from quoting the price pˆ is: 
ω(p¯−1(pˆ))n−1 pˆ − 1 
n 
− (n − 
n 
1)
E[sA �� (sA,sB) ∈ Ω(p¯−1(pˆ))] 
As pˆ > 1 > ((1/n) + ((n − 1)/n)E[sA �(sA,sB) ∈ Ω(p¯−1(pˆ))]), this constitutes a 
proﬁtable deviation, and therefore establishes a contradiction to the premise that p¯
is the equilibrium pricing function for all types s.t. sA
i > X−1(0) and sB
i > X(sA
i ). 
Next, suppose that the equilibrium pricing function p¯ is such that p¯(1) < 1. 
Consider ﬁrm i and suppose sA
i = 1 − ε , with ε > 0 but small. In the event that ﬁrm 
i wins the contract (which occurs with probability (ω(1 − ε))n−1), its proﬁt is neg­
ative. Therefore, it is proﬁtable for ﬁrm i to deviate to pˆ = 1. In the limit as ε 0,↓
ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt from quoting the price pˆ = 1 is zero. We can therefore con­
clude that the boundary condition associated with the above differential equation 
is p¯(1) = 1. Given this boundary condition, the unique solution to the differential 
equation (A.14) is obtained by integrating both sides of (A.14) from x to 1. How­
ever, as ω(1)= 0, the function p¯ is not deﬁned at x = 1. To verify that p¯ nevertheless 
satisﬁes the boundary condition p(1) = 1, we can show that limx 1 p¯(x) = 1.35 ↑
35To show this, repeated use of L’Hoˆpital’s rule is required. For the sake of brevity, we omit the 
details. 
Step 2. Derivation of pricing function p˘. As before, suppose all n ﬁrms use the 
equilibrium speciﬁcation choice rule δ . Consider ﬁrm i with type si s.t. siA = x ≤
X−1(0). I.e. ﬁrm i offers the good in speciﬁcation A, irrespective of the value 
of its B-signal. We again consider ﬁrm i’s problem of which price to quote for 
speciﬁcation A, given that other ﬁrms use the equilibrium pricing functions pA and 
pB in (3) and (4), resp. Suppose that ﬁrm i, instead of submitting the price pA(x) = 
p˘(x), quotes some other price pˆ ≤ p(X−1(0)) for speciﬁcation A. Note that it does 
not pay for ﬁrm i to quote a price pˆ < p˘(0), because this means that ﬁrm i will be 
chosen with probability 1, but can do better by increasing its price slightly so that it 
is still chosen but has a higher proﬁt. Therefore, we only need to consider prices ˆ
[p˘(0), p˘(X−1(0))], which is equivalent to choosing a signal-value xˆ ∈ [0,X−1(0
p 
))] 
∈ 
and quoting the corresponding candidate equilibrium price p˘(xˆ) for speciﬁcation A. 
This yields expected proﬁt: 
Π˘i(xˆ;x) ≡ (1 − FA(xˆ))n−1 
� 
p˘(xˆ) − 
n
x − (n − 1) 
� 
0
1 � 
xˆ
1 s
n
A 
(1 
f 
− 
(sA
F
,
A
s
( 
B
xˆ
)
)) 
dsAdsB 
� 
� 1 � 1 ˘ (A.15) where FA(xˆ) = xˆ 0 f (sA,sB)dsBdsA. Firm i solves maxxˆΠi(xˆ;x), which yields the 
following f.o.c.: 
0 = p˘�(xˆ)(1 − FA(xˆ))n−1 − (n − 1)p˘(xˆ)(1 − FA(xˆ))n−2 fA(xˆ) 
+ 
n − 
n 
1 
(1 − FA(xˆ))n−2 (x + xˆ+(n − 2)E[sA |sA ≥ xˆ ]) fA(xˆ) (A.16) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal value of xˆ = x, so setting xˆ = x in the f.o.c., 
we obtain the differential equation: 
d − 
ds 
p˘(x)(1 − FA(x))n−1 
= 
n − 
n 
1 
(1 − FA(x))n−2 (2x +(n − 2)E[sA |sA ≥ x ]) fA(x) (A.17) 
To obtain a boundary condition for the differential equation (A.17), recall 
from Lemma 2 that the equilibrium pricing function pA is continuous. This implies 
that p˘(X−1(0)) = p(X−1(0)). Given this boundary condition, the unique solution 
to the differential equation (A.17), given by the function p˘(x) in Prop. 2, is obtained 
by integrating both sides of (A.17) from x to X−1(0). 
Step 3. We now prove sufﬁciency by verifying that the solutions to the differential 
equations in (A.14) and (A.17), together with the associated boundary conditions 
�
 ��
 �

�� 
����

p¯(1) = 1 and p˘(X−1(0)) = p¯(X−1(0)), constitute an equilibrium. I.e. we need to 
show that if the n − 1 competitors of ﬁrm i use the pricing functions pA and pB in 
(3) and (4), then it is optimal for ﬁrm i to do so. To show this, we derive in Steps 
3.1 and 3.2 below properties of the expected proﬁt functions Π¯i(xˆ; x) and Π˘i(xˆ;x), 
given by (A.12) and (A.15), resp. These properties are then used in Step 3.3 to 
conclude that the functions p˘ and p¯ constitute an equilibrium. 
Step 3.1. We begin by considering a ﬁrm i whose chosen speciﬁcation is A, and 
whose A-signal is x. If ﬁrm i submits the price p¯(X−1(0)), its expected proﬁt is 
Π¯i(X−1(0);x). If, instead, ﬁrm i submits the price p˘(X−1(0)), its expected proﬁt is 
Π˘i(X−1(0);x). While we omit the details here, it is not difﬁcult to verify that: 
Π¯i(X−1(0);x) − Π˘i(X−1(0);x) = p¯(X−1(0)) − p˘(X−1(0)) 1 − FA(X−1(0)) = 0

This shows that for any given x, the two proﬁt functions Π¯i(xˆ;x) and Π˘i(xˆ;x) inter­
sect at xˆ = X−1(0). 
Step 3.2. Next, we study the behavior of the functions Π¯i(xˆ;x) and Π˘i(xˆ;x), resp., 
as we vary xˆ, while treating x as a ﬁxed “location parameter”. To this end, we 
compute the ﬁrst and second derivatives of the functions Π¯i(xˆ;x) and Π˘i(xˆ;x) w.r.t. 
xˆ. Observe ﬁrst that ∂ Π˘i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ is given by the right-hand side of the f.o.c. in 
(A.16). Now add and subtract xˆ(1 − FA(xˆ))n−2 fA(xˆ)(n − 1)/n from the expression 
for ∂ Π˘i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ. This yields: 
∂ Π˘i(xˆ;x)
= 
∂ Π˘i(xˆ; xˆ) − (xˆ− x) n − 1 (1 − FA(xˆ))n−2 fA(xˆ)∂ xˆ ∂ xˆ n 
= −(xˆ− x) n − 1 (1 − FA(xˆ))n−2 fA(xˆ)n 
where the second line follows from the fact that ∂ Π˘i(xˆ; xˆ)/∂ xˆ= ∂ Π˘i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ
 = xˆ=x 
0. This shows that ∂ Π˘i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ > 0 if xˆ < x, that ∂ Π˘i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ < 0 if xˆ > x, and 
that ∂ Π˘i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ = 0 if xˆ = x. It is straightforward to verify that: 
∂ 2Π˘i(xˆ;x) 
∂ xˆ2 
= −
n − 1

n

(1 − FA(xˆ))n−2 fA(xˆ) < 0 
xˆ=x 
which establishes that Π˘i(xˆ;x) has an interior global maximum at xˆ = x if x < 
X−1(0), and that Π˘i(xˆ;x) reaches its global maximum at the upper boundary of 
its domain (i.e. at xˆ = X−1(0)) if x > X−1(0). 
� � 
�

�

����
 �

Now observe that ∂ Π¯i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ is given by the right-hand side of the f.o.c. 
in (A.13). Now add and subtract xˆω(xˆ)n−2 1 − FB|A (X(xˆ) |xˆ) fA(xˆ)(n − 1)/n from 
the expression for ∂ Π¯i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ. This yields: 
∂ Π¯i(xˆ;x) ∂ Π¯i(xˆ; xˆ) (n − 1) 
∂ xˆ
= 
∂ xˆ
− (xˆ− x)
n 
ω(xˆ)n−2
� 
f ˆ(A1 − FB|A (X(xˆ) |xˆ) x) 
= −(xˆ− x)(n − 1)ω(xˆ)n−2
n 
�
f ˆ(A1 − FB|A (X(xˆ) |xˆ) x) 
This establishes that ∂ Π¯i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ > 0 if xˆ < x, that ∂ Π¯i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ < 0 if xˆ > x, and 
that ∂ Π¯i(xˆ;x)/∂ xˆ = 0 if xˆ = x. As before, it is easy to verify that: 
∂ 2Π¯i(xˆ; xˆ) � 1 F X ˆ( (− B A| x)
We can therefore conclude that Π¯i(xˆ;x) has an interior global maximum at xˆ = x if 
x > X−1(0), and that Π¯i(xˆ;x) reaches its global maximum at the lower boundary of 
its domain (i.e. at xˆ = X−1(0)) if x < X−1(0). 
Step 3.3. To conclude the sufﬁciency argument, consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm i with type 
si s.t. siA = x¯ > X
−1(0) and siB > X(x¯). If the functions p˘ and p¯ constitute an 
equilibrium, then ﬁrm i must prefer the price p¯(x¯) to any price p¯(xˆ), where xˆ is any 
other A-signal in [X−1(0),1]. Likewise, ﬁrm i must prefer p¯(x¯) to any price p˘(x˜), 
where x˜ ∈ [0,X−1(0)]. Our results in Steps 3.1 and 3.2 regarding the behavior of the 
functions Π¯i(xˆ; x) and Π˘i(xˆ;x) imply that for any x¯ ∈ (X−1(0),1]: Π¯i(x¯; x¯) > Π¯i(xˆ; x¯) 
for all xˆ ∈ [X−1(0),1] s.t. xˆ = x¯; and Π¯i(x¯; x¯) > Π¯i(X−1(0); x¯) = Π˘i(X−1(0); x¯) > 
Π˘i(x˜; x¯) for all x˜ ∈ [0,X−1(0)]
�
. I.e. it is optimal for ﬁrm i to submit the price p¯(x¯). 
Now consider a ﬁrm i with type si s.t. sA
i = x˘ < X−1(0). If the functions p˘ and p¯
constitute an equilibrium, ﬁrm i must prefer the price p˘(x˘) to any price p˘(x˜), where x˜ 
is any other A-signal in ∈ [0,X−1(0)]. Likewise, ﬁrm i must prefer p˘(x˘) to any price 
p¯(xˆ), where xˆ ∈ [X−1(0),1]. Our results regarding the behavior of the functions 
Π¯i(xˆ;x) and Π˘i(xˆ;x) imply that for any x˘ ∈ [0,X−1(0)): Π˘i(x˘; x˘) > Π˘i(x˜; x˘) for all x˜ 
in [0,X−1(0)] s.t. x˜ = x˘; and Π˘i(x˘; x˘) > Π˘i(X−1(0); x˘) = Π¯i(X−1(0); x˘) > Π¯i(xˆ; x˘) 
for all xˆ ∈ [X−1(0),1
�
]. I.e. it is optimal for ﬁrm i to submit the price p˘(x˘). 
(n − 1)

ω(xˆ)n−2 xˆ) fA(xˆ) < 0= −
 |
∂ xˆ2 n
xˆ=x 
� 
8.7 Proof of Corollary 1 
We can compute the path integral along the piecewise smooth path Γ1 (see left-hand 
diagram in Fig. 3) as follows: � � 1

Γ1(si ,1) 
qi · dα1 = 
0 
qA
i (y +(1 − y)sAi ,sBi)(1 − sAi )dy
� 2 
+	 qB
i (1,y − 1 +(2 − y)sBi )(1 − sBi )dy. (A.18)
1 
This expression can be simpliﬁed by appropriate integration by substitution. Con­
sider the ﬁrst integral term on the right-hand side of (A.18) and let x = y+(1−y)sAi . 
I.e. dx/dy = 1 − sAi . For y = 0 we have x = siA, and for y = 1 we have x = 1. We 
can therefore rewrite the ﬁrst integral term in (A.18) as follows: � 1 � 1 
qiA(y +(1 − y)siA,siB)(1 − siA)dy = qiA(x,siB)dx 
0	 siA 
Now consider the second integral term on the right-hand side of (A.18) and deﬁne 
x = y − 1 +(2 − y)sBi . I.e. dx/dy = 1 − sBi . For y = 1 we have x = sBi , and for y = 2 
we have x = 1. We can therefore rewrite the second integral term in (A.18) as: � 2 � 1 
qB
i (1,y − 1 +(2 − y)sBi )(1 − sBi )dy = qBi (1,x)dx 
1 siB 
The sum of these two integrals yields the expression for the path integral along Γ1 
featured in expression (8) in Corollary 1. Steps similar to those used above for 
computing the path integral along Γ1 show that the path integral along Γ2 is given 
by the expression in (9) in Corollary 1. 
8.8 Proof of Proposition 4. 
The proof requires us to compute the expected proﬁt E[µi(si)] of any ﬁrm i, using 
the expression for proﬁt µi(si) implicit in (7) in Prop. 4: 
µi(si) − µi(1) = 
Γ(si ,1) 
qi · dα	 (A.19) 
Due to path-independence, the path integral in (A.19) can be evaluated along any 
piecewise smooth path Γ. Here, we compute the expectation in (A.19) by using the 
equivalent expressions for the path integral in equations (8) and (9) of Corollary 1: � � 1 � 1 
qi dα = qA
i (x,sB
i )dx + qB
i (1,x)dx (A.20)
i	 iΓ1(si ,1) 
· 
sA	 sB 
and � � 1 � 1 
qi dα = qB
i (sA
i ,x)dx + qA
i (x,1)dx (A.21)
iΓ2(si ,1) 
· 
sB s
i
A 
We can write:36 � �� � � 1 � si �� � 
qi dα f (si)dsi = 
A 
qi dα f (si)dsiBds
i
A

S Γ(si ,1) 
· 
0 0 Γ1(si ,1) 
·
� 1 � 1 �� � 
+ 
0 sA Γ2(si ,1) 
qi · dα f (si)dsBi dsAi (A.22)i 
Label the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (A.22) as T1, and label the 
second term (in the second line) as T2. Replacing the path integral with the expres­
sion in (A.20), we can split T1 into two additive terms: � 1 � sAi �� 1 � � 1 � sAi �� 1 � 
T1 = qiA(x,s
i
B)dx f (s
i)dsiBdsA
i + qiB(1,x)dx f (s
i)dsB
i dsiA
0 0 siA 0 0 s
i
B 
(A.23) 
Similarly, by replacing the path integral in T2 with the expression in (A.21), we can 
split T2 into two additive terms. � 1 � 1 �� 1 � � 1 � 1 �� 1 � 
T2 = qiB(s
i
A,x)dx f (s
i)dsB
i dsiA + q
i
A(x,1)dx f (s
i)dsB
i dsiA
0 si si 0 si si A B A A 
(A.24) 
Label the ﬁrst term in (A.23) as T11, and label the second term in (A.24) as T22. 
Note that T11 and T22 can be expressed equivalently by changing the order of 
integration: � 1 � 1 �� 1 � 
T11 = qA
i (x,sB
i )dx f (si)dsiAds
i
B
0 siB s
i
A � 1 � si �� 1 � 
T22 = 
B 
qA
i (x,1)dx f (si)dsiAds
i
B 
0 0 siA 
It is then easy to see that T2 can be obtained from T1 by interchanging the speciﬁcation-
subscripts A and B, and vice versa.37 In the remainder of the proof, we therefore 
focus on T1 as the representative expression. We start by simplifying T11 using 
integration by parts on the inner double integral: 
36See Theorem 10-25 on p. 267 in Apostol (1957), which shows that the multiple integral is 
additive. 
37Note that when the speciﬁcation-subscripts A and B are interchanged, the expression qA
i (x,sB
i ), 
for instance, becomes qB
i (sA
i ,x), and vice versa. 
� �	 � � 
�	 � � 
� �	 � � 
� 1 �� 1 � 
qA
i (x,sB
i )dx f (sA
i ,sB
i )dsiAi	 isB sA �� 1 ��� siB � � 1 �� siA � 
= − 
i 
qiA(x,sB
i )dx f (y,sB
i )dy + 
i 
qiA(s
i) f (y,sB
i )dy dsiA 
sB 0 sB 0 
Relabeling the integration index x as sA
i simpliﬁes this expression further: � 1 � i	 � 1 � i 
− 
si 
qA
i (si) 
0 
sB 
f (y,siB)dy dsA
i + 
si 
qA
i (si) 
0 
sA 
f (y,siB)dy dsA
i 
B	 B 
= 
� 
i 
1 
qA
i (si) 
F(sA
i �� sBi ) 
i
−� F
i 
(sB
i �� sBi ) f (si)dsiA

sB f (sA �sB )

We can therefore write: 
T11 = 
� 
0
1 � 
sB
i 
1 
qiA(s
i) 
F(siA �� s
f
i
B 
(
) 
sA
i
−��sFBi () s
i
B 
�� siB ) f (si)dsAi dsiB (A.25) 
Now turn to term T12, which can be simpliﬁed using integration by parts on the 
inner double integral: � si �� 1 �
A 
qiB(1,x)dx g(s
i
B)ds
i
B
�0 � 1 sBi ��� si	 � si � si 
= qiB(1,x)dx 
A
f (siA,y)dy + 
A 
qiB(1,s
i
B) 
B
f (siA,y)dy ds
i
B 
sA
i 0	 0 0 
Relabeling the integration index x as sB
i simpliﬁes this expression further: � 1 � si	 � si � si 
qiB(1,s
i
B) 
A
f (siA,y)dy dsB
i + 
A 
qiB(1,s
i
B) 
B
f (siA,y)dy ds
i
B 
sA
i 0 0 0 
=	
� 1 
qB
i (1,sB
i ) 
F(sm
i 
i��� sAi ) f (si)dsiB

0 f (sB
i �sAi )

We can therefore write: � 1 � 1 i � i 
T12 = 
0 0 
qB
i (1,sB
i ) 
F
f 
(
(
s
s
m
B
i 
i ���ssAiA )) f (si)dsBi dsiA (A.26) 
The full expression for T1 is the sum of T11 in (A.25) and T12 (A.26). The ex­
pressions T21 and T22 that constitute T2 can now be obtained by interchanging the 
�
 � ��
��
��
��
� 
��
 ��
�� ��
 ��
���
 ��
 ��
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�
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� �
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��
� 
speciﬁcation-subscripts A and B in (A.25) and (A.26), resp. The full expression for 
T2 is then the sum of T21 and T22, and the expectation of the path integral in (A.19) 
is the sum of T1 and T2: 
mi 
i
 i i

B ) 
i

A )F(s
 F(s
s
 s
i i

A(sA,1) 
i i

B(1,sB) 
i)dsimi
i
 f (s
+ q
q
 i

B ) 
i
 i

A )f (s
 f (s
S s
 s
BA � 1 � 1 F(si i i
B ) − F(s i
B )s
 s
BAi

A(s
i) f (si)dsiAds
i
B+ q
 i
 i

B )f (s
i
0 s
s AB � 1 � 1 F(si i i
A ) − F(s s
i
A )s
B A i)dsiBdsiA i
B(si) f (s
+ q
 i
 i

A )f (s
i
0 s
s BA 
i

B(s , 
i) i
 i ��A ) f (si)/ f (si i ��A )In the integrand in the second line, add and subtract q
 F(si

A(s
i) 
s
A 
s
A 
B B 
i

B )
i
 i i

B ) f (s
i)/ f (sand in the integrand in the third line, add and subtract q
 F(s
 s
 s
 .

Then, using the notation sm
i 
i 
for ﬁrm i’s minimum signal, we can collect terms and 
write E[µi(si)] − µi(1) as: 
i
 s
i
l )
i
 i

l ) � F(s
F(s
 s
kq
i
k(si) i i i i)
k(sk,1) − q k(s i)dsi∑
 mi
i
 f (s
+
 q
i
 i

l ) s

i

l )f (s
 f (s
s
k,l∈K 
l=k 
k kS 
We can now write E[µi(si)] − µi(1) in terms of Qik: 
i
 i

l )
i
 i

l ) F(s
F(s
 s
s
Qik(s) 
k Qik((sk
i ,1),s−i)∑
 ∑
 mi
i
g(s)ds +
 g(s)ds
i
 i

l ) 
i

l )f (s
 f (s
Sn Sns
 s
k,l∈K 
l=k 
k,l∈K 
l=k 
k k 
i
 s
i
l )F(s
∑ Qki (s) mi
i
 g(s)ds (A.27)
−
 s
i
l )f (s
Sn k,l∈K 
l=k 
k 
∑k∈K Qik(s)Ck(sk) 
µi(1) in (A.27), we obtain the following expression for E[ti(s
i)]−
i)] − (ti(1) − ci(1)): 
Adding ﬁrm i’s ex ante expected production cost E
 to E[µi(s
i
 s
i
l )
i
 i

l ) � F(s
F(s
 s
Qik(s) Ck(sk)+ k Qik((sik,1),s−i) − Qik(s)∑
 mi
i
 g(s)ds
+
i
 i

l ) s

i

l )f (s
 f (s
Sn s
k,l∈K 
l=k 
k k 
(A.28) 
Summing (A.28) over all ﬁrms we ﬁnally obtain the buyer’s expected expenditure 
in Prop. 4. 
� 
8.9 Proof of Proposition 5. 
We have to establish that Qi (s) = 0 for all s in the interior of Sn and all i ∈ I.Mi 
To see this, consider the sum of the integrands in the second and third lines of the 
expression for ex ante expenditure in (11): � � � � �� 
∑ Qimi (s)Cmi (smi )+ QiMi (s) CMi (sMi )+ 
F(sM
i 
i 
�s
f
m
i 
(
i
s
) 
i 
−��sFi (s) m
i 
i 
�smi i ) (A.29) 
i∈I Mi mi 
A SCR Q that minimizes (11) must minimize (A.29) for every s ∈ Sn, subject 
to ∑i∈I(Qi (s) + Qi (s)) = 1. Now consider a type-vector s in the interior of mi Mi 
Sn s.t. mi = k ∀i ∈ I. In this case, the coefﬁcient associated with any Qki (s) 
in (A.29) is Ck(sk), while that associated with any Qil(s) is Cl(sl) + (F(s
i �si � � l k ) −
F(si �sik )/ f (si �sik )) > Cl(sl) > Ck(sk). It is therefore optimal to set Qil(s) = 0 ∀i.k l 
Next consider a type-vector s in the interior of Sn s.t. mi = l and ∃ j ∈ I, j =� i, s.t. 
= k. In this case, the coefﬁcient associated with Qk
j
(s) in (A.29) is Ck(sk), while m j � � �
the coefﬁcient associated with Qik(s) is Ck(sk)+ (F(s
i
k 
�sil ) − F(sil �sil ))/ f (sik �sil ) > 
Ck(sk). It is therefore optimal to set Qk
j
(s) = 0. By the same logic, Ql
j
(s) = 0. 
8.10 Proof of Proposition 6. 
We have to establish that any Q that minimizes ex ante expenditure in (11), and 
which generates functions qi s.t. (8) and (9) in Corollary 1 are equal, must be s.t. qA
i 
and qiB are of the form shown in (12) in Prop. 6. By Corollary 1, ∀i ∈ I and ∀si ∈ S: � 
s
1 
i
A 
qiA(x,s
i
B)dx + 
� 
s
1 
i
B 
qiB(1,x)dx = 
� 
s
1 
i
B 
qiB(s
i
A,x)dx + 
� 
s
1 
i
A 
qiA(x,1)dx. As Q minimizes 
expenditure in (11) (which, by Prop. 5, implies Qi (s) = 0 ∀s ∈ Sn), we can write: Mi 
(i) 
� 
s
s
i
A
i � 
qiB(1,x) − qiB(siA,x) 
� 
dx = 
� 
s
1 
i
A 
� 
qiA(x,1) − qiB(1,x) 
� 
dx if siA > s
i
B
B 
(ii) 
� 
s
siB 
� 
qiA(x,1) − qiA(x,siB) 
� 
dx = 
� 
s
1 
i 
� 
qiB(1,x) − qiA(x,1) 
� 
dx if siA < s
i 
i B. 
A B 
For any si s.t. siA = s
i
B = s ∈ [0,1), (i) and (ii) hold iff qiA(s,1) = qiB(1,s) ∀s ∈ [0,1). 
Thus: 
(i) 
� 
s
s
B
i
A
i � 
qiB(1,x) − qiB(siA,x) 
� 
dx = 0 ⇔ qiB(siA,sBi ) = qBi (1,siB) ∀si s.t. siA > siB 
(ii) 
� s
i
i
B 
� 
qiA(x,1) − qiA(x,siB) 
� 
dx = 0 qiA(s
i
A,s
i
B) = q
i
A(s
i
A,1) ∀si s.t. siA < siB. sA ⇔ 
Setting qB
i (1,s) = qA
i (s,1) ≡ ρi(s), we obtain qAi (si) and qBi (si) in Prop. 6. 
� � � � 
8.11 Proof of Proposition 7. 
We need to show that any qi in (12) with decreasing function ρi is monotone and 
conservative. It is straightforward to verify that if ρi is decreasing, then qi in (12) is 
monotone. We now show in two steps that qi is conservative. For this purpose, we 
draw on a result in Jehiel et al. (1999) that provides necessary and sufﬁcient condi­
tions for any piecewise continuous function qi to be conservative. For convenience, 
we re-state this result in the notation of our paper: 
Proposition 10. (Jehiel et al., 1999) Assume qi : S [0,1]|K| is piecewise contin­
uous. That is, assume there exists a partition {M1
→ 
, ...,Mϑ } of the unit square S 
such that qi restricted to the interior of Mζ is continuous for each ζ = 1, . . . ,ϑ . 
Suppose each Mζ has a piecewise smooth boundary. Then, qi is conservative iff 
(i) qi restricted to Mζ is conservative for each ζ = 1, . . . ,ϑ ; and (ii) whenever 
Mζ and Mη are two adjacent regions, the jump in qi(si) as si crosses from Mζ 
to Mη is perpendicular to the common boundary between Mζ and Mη . That is, 
if si is in the common boundary between Mζ and Mη , and n is the unitary nor­
mal vector of the boundary between Mζ and Mη at si, then the vector Δqi(si) ≡
limε 0+ qi(si − εn) − limε 0+ qi(si + εn) is parallel to n. → →
Step 1. We verify that any qi in (12) with monotonically decreasing function ρi 
satisﬁes item (ii) of Prop. 10. As ρi is decreasing on [0,1], the left-hand limit ρi
−(s) 
≡ limx s− ρi(x) and the right-hand limit ρ+(s) ≡ limx s+ ρi(x) are both ﬁnite at i→ →
every s ∈ (0,1), with ρi−(s) ≥ ρ+(s), and ρi can only display countably many jump i 
discontinuities, if any. 
Step 1 (a). Suppose ﬁrst that ρi is continuous everywhere in (0,1). Partition S 
into two convex subsets Mk 
0 ≡ {si : ski ≤ sli} (k, l ∈ K, l =� k). Fix a type si = (s,s) in 
the common boundary between MA 
0 and MB
0, which is the 45◦-line in the unit square 
S. A normal vector of the boundary between MA 
0 and MB 
0 at si is n = (−1,1). The 
jump in qi(si) as si crosses from MB 
0 to MA 
0 is: 
q qΔqi(s,s) = lim 
i
A(s + ε,s − ε) − lim 
i
A(s − ε,s + ε) 
ε 0+ qiB(s + ε,s − ε) ε 0+ qiB(s − ε,s + ε)�→ � →−ρi−(s)= ρi−(s) 
� � � � 
It is easy to see that n and Δqi(s,s) are parallel vectors because their cross product 
is zero:38 (−1) ρi−(s) − 1 (−ρi−(s)) = 0.39 · · 
Step 1 (b). We now consider the case where ρi is not continuous at every s ∈
(0,1). Let {s1,s2, . . . ,sϑ } be the set of discontinuities of ρi, where ϑ ∈ N and 
0 < s1 < . . . < sϑ < 1.40 At each point sη (η = 1, ...,ϑ ) we have ρi
−(sη ) > ρi 
+(sη ) 
and ρi(sη ) ∈ [ρ+(sη ),ρi−(sη )]. Now deﬁne the following subsets of S: ∀k, l ∈ K,i 
i i i i i il =� k, let Mk 1 ≡ {si : 0 ≤ sk ≤ s1,sl ≥ sk}, Mk ζ ≡ {si : sζ −1 ≤ sk ≤ sζ ,sl ≥ sk} for 
ζ = 2, ...,ϑ , and Mk 
ϑ +1 ≡{si : sϑ ≤ sik ≤ 1,sil ≥ ski }. If the number of discontinuities 
of ρi is ϑ = 1 we shall partition S into {Mk 1 ,Mϑ +1}k∈K . If, instead, ϑ ≥ 2 we shall k 
ipartition S into {Mk 1 ,Mk ζ ,Mk ϑ +1}k∈K,ζ ∈{2,...,ϑ}. For given ϑ ≥ 1, ﬁx si = (sη ,sB) 
i(with sB > sη ) in the common boundary between MA 
η and MA 
η+1 (η = 1, . . . ,ϑ ). 
This boundary is a vertical line. The unitary normal vector of the boundary between 
MA 
η and MA 
η+1 at si is n˜ = (−1,0). The jump in qi(si) as si crosses from Mη+1 to 
MA 
η is: 
A 
Δqi(sη ,sB
i ) = lim 
qA
i (sη + ε,sB
i ) − lim qA
i (sη − ε,sBi ) 
ε 0+ qiB(sη + ε,s
i
B) ε 0+ q
i
B(sη + ε,s
i
B)�→ � →−[ρi−(sη ) − ρ+(sη )] i= 0 
It is easy to see that the vectors n˜ and Δqi(sη ,sB
i ) are parallel because their cross 
product is zero: (−1) 0 − 0 (−[ρi−(sη ) − ρi +(sη )]) = 0. An analogous argument 
can be made for any si 
· 
= (siA,
· 
sη ) (with siA > sη ) in the common boundary between 
MB 
η and MB 
η+1 (where η = 1, . . . ,ϑ ). Furthermore, the argument in Step 1(a) can be 
replicated to establish that if si = (s,s) is a point in the common boundary between 
MA 
η and MB 
η for any η = 1, . . . ,ϑ , then the jump in qi(si) as si crosses from MB 
η to 
MA 
η is perpendicular to the common boundary between MA 
η and MB 
η . Therefore, any 
qi given by (12), with decreasing ρi, satisﬁes item (ii) of Prop. 10. 
Step 2. We now verify that any function qi in (12) with decreasing ρi satisﬁes 
item (i) of Prop. 10. Observe that qi is continuous when restricted to the interior 
38In two dimensions, the cross product of two vectors v1 = (v11,v12) and v2 = (v21,v22) is v1 × 
v2 = det(v1,v2) = v11v22 − v12v21. 
39The unitary normal vector of the boundary between MA 
0 and MB 
0 at si is (1/
√
2)n, with corre­
sponding jump Δqi(s,s) given in the text. As Δqi(s,s) is parallel to n, it is obvious that Δqi(s,s) is 
also parallel to the unitary normal vector (1/
√
2)n, as required by Prop. 10. 
40Note that there could, in fact, be a countable inﬁnity of discontinuities. While necessitating 
minor changes in notation, the proof would be otherwise unaffected. 
int(Mk 
η ) of any Mk 
η in the partition of S (k ∈ K, η = 1, . . . ,ϑ + 1). Each int(Mk η ) 
is an open set in R2, and any two points in int(Mk 
η ) can be connected by a path in 
int(Mk 
η ). Given these properties of qi and int(Mk 
η ), we can appeal to Theorem 6 
in chapter V, §5, of Lang (1973), which establishes that the existence of a potential 
function φi for qi is equivalent to path-independence of the integral of qi from one 
point in int(Mk 
η ) to another. Therefore, all we have to show is that the continuous 
ifunction q on any int(Mk 
η ) has a potential function. It is easy to verify that, for all 
k ∈ K and all η = 1, . . . ,ϑ + 1, the function φk η (si) = 
� sη+1 ρi(x)dx is a potential isk 
function for (12). 
8.12 Proof of Proposition 9. 
Take an efﬁcient and incentive compatible SCR Q that satisﬁes the necessary con­
dition for expenditure-minimization in Proposition 5. Fix a type-pair (s¯1 , s¯2) with 
s¯i sB
i for all i = 1,2. For ﬁxed ¯ A ,s
−
B
i)-diagram (see ei-A < ¯ s
i, we can depict Q in a (s−i 
ther panel of Fig. 7). Efﬁciency and optimality fully determine which speciﬁcation-
ﬁrm-pair is chosen for types s−i below the 45◦-line in the (s−A
i ,s−B
i)-diagram. Now 
consider the left-hand panel of Fig. 7. As Q is efﬁcient and satisﬁes the condition 
in Proposition 5, it must choose ﬁrm 1 to supply speciﬁcation A for all types s2 
below the 45◦-line for which speciﬁcation A is efﬁcient. This event is highlighted 
in the left-hand panel of Fig. 7 by the dark grey area below the 45◦-line. To ensure 
incentive compatibility, the efﬁcient SCR Q must generate conditional expected 
probability assignment functions qi that satisfy the necessary condition in footnote 
24. This implies that each qA
i must be independent of ﬁrm i’s maximum signal siB. 
In particular, to ensure that this requirement holds for ﬁrm 1, Q must also choose 
ﬁrm 1 to supply speciﬁcation A for all types s2 in the dark grey area above the 45◦­
line in the left-hand panel of Fig. 7. It is easy to verify (given the fact that f is 
symmetric around the 45◦-line) that the two dark grey areas together give rise to a 
conditional expected probability assignment function q1 A(s¯
1) that is independent of 
s¯B
1 : 
1 � s¯A 1 � 1 
q1 A(s¯
1) = 
2 
− 
0 sA+(1−s¯A) 
f (s2 A,s
2 
B)dsB
2 s2 A (A.30)2 1 
We now argue by contradiction that ﬁrm 1 with type s¯1 s.t. s¯A 
1 < s¯B 
1 must 
also be chosen to supply speciﬁcation A for all types s2 in the light grey area in the 
top left corner of the left-hand panel of Fig. 7. Suppose instead that ﬁrm 2 is chosen 
to produce speciﬁcation A in the light grey area in the left-hand panel of Fig. 7. In 
particular, consider the type (s¯A
2 , s¯B
2 ) shown in the left-hand panel of Fig. 7, and 
suppose that ﬁrm 2 is chosen to supply speciﬁcation A. Note that for each type s2 in 
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Figure 7: Elements of efﬁcient SCR that satisﬁes the property in Proposition 5 
the light grey area, it holds that sB 
2 > (1− s¯A1 )+sA2 , or equivalently s¯A 1 > 1−(s2 B −sA2 ). 
Now turn to the right-hand panel of Fig. 7, where the type s¯1 highlighted there 
corresponds to the same type-pair (s¯1 , s¯2) as the type s¯2 highlighted in the left-hand 
panel of Fig. 7. Therefore, if ﬁrm 2 is chosen to supply speciﬁcation A at type s¯2 
in the left-hand panel, ﬁrm 2 is obviously also chosen to produce speciﬁcation A 
at the type s¯1 in the right-hand panel. This implies that if ﬁrm 2 is chosen for all 
types s2 in the light grey area of the left-hand panel, then ﬁrm 2 is chosen to supply 
speciﬁcation A for all types s1 in the light grey area of the right-hand panel (i.e. 
for all types s1 above the 45◦-line s.t. sA 
1 > 1 − (s¯B 2 − s¯A2 ). This, however, implies 
that ﬁrm 2’s conditional expected probability assignment function qA
2 (s¯2) depends 
explicitly on s¯B
2 , in violation of the necessary condition for incentive compatibility 
in footnote 24. We can therefore conclude that ﬁrm 1 must be chosen to supply 
speciﬁcation A for all types s2 s.t. sB 
2 > (s¯1 B − s¯A1 )+ sA 2 in the left-hand panel of Fig. 
7. This, however, means that the only efﬁcient and incentive compatible SCR Q 
that satisﬁes the necessary condition in Proposition 5 is Q¯ in Fig. 5. 
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